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If a litigant cannot be guaranteedthat his or her cause will be
decided by an honest assessment of the facts and a conscientious application of the law to the facts, unencumbered by
extraneous influences, then the outcome will merely be a decision for the sake of a decision; having nothing to do with the
law, it will be the negation of the rule of law.'

Nigel Rodley. A Symposium on ConstitutionalRights and International Human Rights Honoring ProfessorDavid Kretzmer: The Singarasa Case: Quis Custodiet... ? A Testfor the Bangalore PrinciplesofJudicialConduct, 41 ISR. L. REv. 500. 512 (2008).
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A recent study of Michigan,Nevada, and Texas judges... concludes that campaign contributions have an impact on judicial
decisions in states with partisan election ofjudges. How can
we confidently proclaim that our democratic system ofjustice is
a model for the world when members of our own public - and
even many2 individuals who hold judicial office - doubt its impartiality?

It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.3

-

Justice John Paul Stevens
INTRODUCTION

A.

The Fundamental Questions

How much risk will Americans tolerate to the rule of law in the United
States and the ideal of an impartial system of justice? How much risk are we
tolerating already? How did we get to this point? Is there anything that we can
do to pull back or change course? If we do not, what are the consequences?
Should we really have to be asking these questions at this late stage of American
democracy?
This Article will consider the recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Caperton4 and Citizens United" which directly or indirectly raise these
2

Ronald M. George, Foreword: Achieving Impartiality in State Courts, 97 CALIF. L. REV.

1853, 1863 (2009).
[S]urveys have shown that three-quarters of the public believes money and
special interests play a significant role in how judicial decisions are made. In
Texas ...a study of judges, lawyers, and the public showed that a substantial
number of each, 48, 79, and 85 percent, respectively, believe that campaign
contributions had an effect on judicial decisions .... A recent study of Michigan, Nevada, and Texas judges reveals that these perceptions may not be unfounded; the paper concludes that campaign contributions have an impact on
judicial decisions in states with partisan election of judges. How can we confidently proclaim that our democratic system of justice is a model for the
world when members of our own public - and even many individuals who
hold judicial office- doubt its impartiality?
Id. (footnotes omitted: emphasis in text).
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98. 128 (2000) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
4
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
5
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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questions concerning elected state court judiciaries. Many countries do not have
a reliably impartial justice system; 6 and Americans' ability to keep their system
of justice impartial (either in fact or in appearance) in their elected state courts is
in doubt. According to public opinion surveys and extensive commentary, a
high percentage of people "believe[] money and special interests play a significant role in how judicial decisions are made...7 "[J]udicial neutrality and the
appearance of neutrality is under severe threat across the country from escalating special-interest spending on judicial campaigns." 8 Business groups are
likewise concerned about bias overall, as shown through the recent report of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Law Reform, noting that bias is perceived as a key factor by its survey respondents in assessing the fairness of a
state's liability system. 9 Although Americans may allay concerns about impartiality with presumptions of impartiality and other soothing doctrines, the system is at risk and perhaps has already deteriorated.
B.

Suppose Justice Is Not Impartial

Without impartial judges, justice is pointless, and as noted in a quote
commencing this Article, merely results in a decision for the sake of a deci-

6

See generally RULE

BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

(Tom

Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, eds. 2008) [hereinafter RULE By LAW].
7
George, supra note 2, at 1863.
8
Editorial, From Scandal to Example in West irginia,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at A24,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/3/19/opinion/19fri3.html?scp l&sq west /20
virginia%20and%20public%20financing&st cse.
9
See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, RANKING THE
STATES:

LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2010: STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS SURVEY 5 (2010). available at

http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/ documents/pdf/lawsuitclimate20 1O/201 La
wsuitClimateReport.pdf:
To understand why respondents feel negatively about particular jurisdictions,
a follow-up question was asked to those who cited a jurisdiction. More than a
third (37%) of respondents mentioned that the reason why a city or county has
the least fair and reasonable litigation environment is because of biased or partial juries/judges. This is the number one reason by a large margin.
Similar concerns about impartiality are found in the American Tort Reform Foundation.
AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2 (2009 2010), available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf:
While most judges honor their commitment to be unbiased arbiters in the pursuit of truth and justice, Judicial Hellholes judges do not. Instead, these few
jurists may favor local plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients over defendant corporations. Some, in remarkable moments of candor, have admitted their biases. More often, judges may. with the best of intentions, make rulings for the
sake of expediency or efficiency that have the effect of depriving a party of its
right to a proper defense.
Id. (internal footnote omitted).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/8

4

Green: How Great is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias - An Inquiry i
2010]

HOW GREATIS AMERICA'S TOLERANCE FOR JUDICIAL BIAS?

877

sion.10 It may also legalize unfairness and oppression.
Benjamin Franklin,
when asked about the nature of the country's new form of government, answered to the effect that our form of government is a republic (if we can keep
it)." The quote is often repeated, but the lesson that vigilance is needed to preserve our republic and its values - however versatile they may seem - is timeless and relevant to judicial impartiality. The lack of impartiality is not something that is "someone else's problem." If the judge in your case is biased or
appears to be biased, you will find it impossible to ignore; and unless this is
corrected, you will wonder whatever happened to the American dream of impartial justice.
C.

The Supreme Court and Impartiality

This Article begins with reference to general principles of the rule of
law,' 2 described by Chief Justice John Roberts in Citizens United as a "constitutional ideal,"'13 principally concerning an impartial judiciary. It will then consider the nature and implications of Caperton and Citizens United.
Although Caperton upheld a litigant's right to recusal of the judge
whose electoral success was financially engineered by the litigant's adversary, it
was a near-miss narrow (5-4) decision, which just barely rescued Caperton from
having his case reviewed by the legally biased judge. According to Caperton,
there is limited hope of addressing bias under the federal constitution in future
cases, with the issue being largely left to the states.
In a separate 5-4 decision, Citizens United invalidated long-standing
campaign finance reform on First Amendment grounds. In the name of free
speech rights, the case permits extensive corporate and union funding of elections, and by inference, judicial elections; and unless legislatively restricted, the

10 Rodley. supra note 1. at 512.
11 Scott Horton, A Republic, If You Can Keep It, HARPERS MAGAZINE, July 20, 2007, available
at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/hbc-90000592. The article describes the often quoted
episode when:
Benjamin Franklin left the Constitutional Convention, on September 18, 1787,

a certain Mrs. Powel shouted out to him: "Well, doctor, what have we got?,"
and Franklin responded: "A Republic, if you can keep it." Like many of the
Founding Fathers, he was intensely concerned that the democratic institutions
they were crafting would deteriorate over time.
12 An interesting description of the rule of law appears at Venelin I. Ganev, The Rule of Law
as an Institutionalized Wager: Constitutions, Courts and Transformative Social Dynamics in
Eastern Europe, 1 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 263, 282 (2009) (quoting Michael Oakeshott. The
Rule of Law. in ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 178 (1999)). "The rule of law bakes no bread, it
is unable to distribute loaves or fishes (it has none). and it cannot protect against external assault,
but it remains the most civilized and least burdensome conception of a state yet to be devised."
Id.
13 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 921 (2010) (Roberts. C.J., concurring).
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case has the potential for pouring more money into the judicial election system
and further exacerbating bias risks.
Although Republican Partyof Minnesota v. White is not at the center of
this Article, some also question the effect on impartiality of expanded judicial
campaign speech under this U.S. Supreme Court 2002 decision; a separate concern is excessive responsiveness to the views of local voters, since the judge
needs the voters' continuing support in order to be reelected. 14 "The 'situation'
of apparent judicial bias has never been so obvious as it is in the current climate.
White shows a Supreme Court unwilling to curtail political speech; thus, judicial
candidates are free to announce their legal and political biases with impunity[,],,1 5 although they may not make campaign promises on how they would

decide cases. 16 The danger of bias as a result of candidate speech has been a
special concern in criminal cases where judges have campaigned on "law and
order" platforms.' Observations on White may be made throughout the Article
as well.
14

See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 786 (2002); see also Thomas R.

Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll. Free Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial
Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 691, 707 20 (2007) (focusing on recusal in
view of campaign statements made by candidates). With respect to pandering to local voters, see
Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on JudicialSelection, 56 MERCER L. REV. 949. 957 (2005) [hereinafter Perspectives on Judicial Selection]; Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80, 90 (2009); and Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1061, 1064
(2010) ("Recent studies demonstrate that elected judges face more political pressure and reach

legal results more in keeping with local public opinion than appointed judges do.") (footnote
omitted).
15 Jason D. Grimes, Note, Aligning Judicial Elections With Our Constitutional Values: The
Separation of Powers, Judicial Free Speech, and Due Process, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 863, 883
(2009).
16 According to Chief Justice Randall Shepard of the Indiana Supreme Court, a campaign
promise by a judge to rule consistently with that promise arguably implicates bribery:
[A] litigant ought to make a passable case against a sitting judge by asserting
that the judge has a direct, personal interest in ruling in accordance with his
promise because it is central to his reelection, his personal employment. This
interest is by any measure substantial... [T]his interest is pecuniary inasmuch
as the judge is paid and the benefits flowing from the payment inure not to the

court system but to the judge personally. Arguably, therefore, a campaign
promise is a bribe offered to voters, paid with rulings consistent with that
promise, in return for continued employment as a judge.
Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in JudicialEthics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1059, 1088 (1996).
17 An amicus brief in Caperton,from the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys,
made this very point about the risk of bias in criminal cases arising from campaign statements on
toughness on crime:
Under the Due Process Clause, every litigant is entitled to a fair hearing before a fair tribunal. This mandate is particularly crucial to criminal defendants
who face the loss of liberty or life and depend on judges to protect their constitutional rights. There is a tension between an elected judge's accountability
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The Article will also consider various potential solutions, such as a
change in judicial selection systems away from judicial elections, altered recusal
procedures, and legislative responses to Citizens United to reduce threats to
judicial impartiality.
D.

Some Observations on the InternationalPromotion of the Rule of Law

The United States, through the Department of State, USAID, other
agencies, and their various implementers; international financial institutions,
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; the European
Union and various other countries; the American Bar Association through its
Rule of Law Initiative; and many NGO's have been engaged in rule of law promotion for many years in developing countries, with expenditures of billions of
dollars.1 8 These rule of law efforts have involved improved governance and
institutions, including judicial and related institutions, and have been traced,
to those constituencies who assisted in his or her election and the judge's role
as independent and impartial arbiter. This tension is particularly pronounced
in criminal cases because elected judges often run on "tough on crime" platforms.
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Jan. 5, 2009, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Co. Inc., 2009 WL 27299, at *2; see
also Examining the State of JudicialRecusals After Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy, Dec. 10,
2009 (written statement of Norman L. Reimer, Executive Director, National Association of Crim-

inal Defense Lawyers. on behalf of the Nat'l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers). available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cddO2b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/b2360080587918578
5257686006a3b6f/$FILE/NLRTestimonyI 2-10-09.pdf :
Recusal should be mandatory in any criminal case that will raise an issue
about which the judge promised to be "tough." Mandatory recusal (disqualification) offers the additional benefit of giving judicial candidates cover to
avoid "tough on crime" rhetoric and promises. In addition, such a policy diminishes the risk that political considerations will taint judicial decisions; that
is, the rule shields judges seeking re-election from political attacks for making
legally correct but politically unpopular decisions.
Jd. at 5-6.
18
See generally Norman L. Greene, Perspectives From the Rule of Law and International
Economic Development: Are There Lessons for the Reform of Judicial Selection in the United
States?, 86 DENy. U. L. REv. 53, 54 (2008) [hereinafter Perspectives From the Rule of Law].
The author is on the regional advisory council for the ABA Rule of Law Initiative's CEELI
division (its Europe and Eurasia program). See ABA Rule of Law Initiative, Promoting the Rule
of Law, Europe & Eurasia, http://www.abanet.org/rol/europe and eurasia/ (last visited Apr. 12,
2010).
The principles advocated by the United States abroad through rule of law promotion are relevant
to the evaluation of America's own practices. See Perspectives From the Rule of Law. See also
David Rosenbaum, Abram Chayes, John Kennedy Aide, Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000
(quoting Abram Chayes. a "professor of international law at Harvard for more than 40 years and
a top State Department official in the Kennedy administration": "There is 'nothing wrong...
with holding the United States to its own best standards and best principles."').
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with some controversy, to improved economic development.1 9 The efforts may
also include improving civil and criminal codes, judicial and other legal education, bar association development, civic education, anti-corruption, women's
rights, and other topics.
The promotion of women's rights, including enhancement of women's
educational and other opportunities and eliminating violence against women
through legislation or otherwise, is an important part of rule of law reform. Indeed, some have identified such improvement as an essential link in economic
development, including at a recent conference in Washington, D.C. on women's
empowerment in Morocco.20 If one wishes to "enliven" economies, "leaders of
19

The cause and effect relationship between rule of law reform and economic progress has

often been asserted and sometimes questioned. See generally Perspectives From the Rule of Law,
supra note 18, at 76. Policymakers nevertheless have spent vast sums on such reforms for various
reasons, including their assumption of a connection between improved rule of law and economic
development. Id.; see also id. at 55 ("The notion that the rule of law promotes economic development is built on various factors, including common sense, practical assumptions, logic, and to
some extent, empirical studies.").
20
See Norman L. Greene. Provocative, Fast-Moving Conference Held in Washington on
Women's Empowerment in Morocco, MoroccoBoard, March 23, 2010, available at
http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/34-news-release/949-provocative-fast-moving-conferenceheld-in-washington-on-womens-empowerment-in-morocco (copy also on file with the West Virginia Law Review). The March 17, 2010 event commenced with the observations of co-chair and
moderator Martha Dye, a Washington, D.C. attorney experienced in the promotion of women's
rights, particularly in Morocco. "Recalling the slogan from the 1992 Clinton campaign 'It's the
economy. stupid,' [Ms. Dye] observed that the battle cry today, for those seeking to advance development. should be: 'It's women's rights, stupid.'" Id. The conference, which the author attended, also included extensive presentations by attorney Stephanie Willman Bordat of Global
Rights in Morocco on attempts to secure legislation outlawing violence against women and by
other experts on the promotion of women's rights - Professor Fatima Sadiqi (Senior Professor of
Linguistics and Gender Studies at the University of Fez, Morocco), Dr. Susan Schaeffer Davis (an
anthropologist with extensive experience with Moroccan women and adolescents and the author
of two books on those topics), and Dr. Salma Lemtouni (a physician expert on women's health
issues)
from the standpoint of relevant historical forces, economic empowerment. and emotional empowerment. The conference was one of the twenty events held in March 2010, celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Washington Moroccan American Club. a Washington. D.C.
community organization, described at http://www.washingtonmoroccanclub.org/ For a description of some of the events and participants, see Norman L. Greene, The Washington Moroccan
American Club's Ambitious 20120 Project Takes Shape, WASH. MOROCCAN CLUB, Feb. 28, 2010,

available
at
http://www.washingtonmoroccanclub.org/articles/the-washington-moroccanamerican-clubs-ambitious-2020-pro ect-takes-shape--.html (written anonymously by author)
(copy also on file with the West Virginia Law Review), and Norman L. Greene, WMC 20 Organizing Committee of Washington Moroccan American Club Holds Planning Meeting available at
http://ww. washingtonmoroccanclub.org/articles/wmc-20--organizing-committee-of-washingtonmoroccan-american-club-holds-planning-meeting-.html(describing January 10, 2010 meeting;

written anonymously by author) (copy also on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
Although the conference focused on Morocco, the themes were universal as well as multidisciplinary. According to international development expert and author Wade Channell, for example, "investment in women's education has one of the highest returns in development activi-

ties." Interview of Wade Channell by author in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 2010). Mr. Channell
is, among other things, the author of Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform,
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poor countries" should educate and provide employment opportunities to women.2 "The economic advantages of empowering women are so vast as to persuade nations to move in that direction. 22 The then Secretary General of the
UN noted in 2006, "As study after study has taught us, there is no tool for development more effective than the empowerment of women.' 3
Rule of law promotion has also historically included ensuring or promoting a qualified, independent, and impartial judiciary. Although the problems
addressed in developing nations are challenging, the United States has challenges of its own in that regard, as shown by the recent United States Supreme
in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed.,

Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 2006). Accord, NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WuDUNN,
TURNING OPPRESSION INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN WORLDWIDE 169-170
(2009) ("One study after another has shown that educating girls is one of the most effective ways
to fight poverty. Schooling is also often a precondition for girls and women to stand up against
injustice, and for women to be integrated into the economy. Until women are numerate and literate, it is difficult for them to start businesses or contribute meaningfully to their national economies .... [T]he case for investing in girls' education is still very, very strong.").
For a sample of scholarly literature on Moroccan women and their struggle for increased rights,
HALF THE SKY:

see, e.g., RACHEL NEWCOMB. WOMEN OF FES: AMBIGUITIES OF URBAN LIFE IN MOROCCO (2009):
SUSAN SCHAEFER DAVIS, PATIENCE AND POWER: WOMEN'S LIVES IN A MOROCCAN VILLAGE

(1996); Amna Arshad. tjtihad as a Toolfor Islamic Legal Reform: Advancing Women's Rights in
Morocco, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (2006-2007); Francesco Cavatorta & Emanuela Dalmasso, Liberal Outcomes Through Undemocratic Means: The Reform of the Code de Statut Personnel in Morocco, 47 J. OF MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 487 (2009); Katja Zvan Elliott, Reforming the
Moroccan PersonalStatus Code: A Revolution for Whom?, 14 MEDITERRANEAN POL.213 (2009);

Moha Ennaji. Steps to the Integration of Moroccan Women in Development. 35 BRITISH J. OF
MIDDLE E. STUD. 339 (2008); Fatima Sadiqi, Facing Challenges and Pioneering Feminist and
Gender Studies: Women in Post-Colonialand Today's Maghrib, 7 AFRICAN & ASIAN STUD.447
(2008); Fatima Sadiqi, The Central Role of the Family Law in the Moroccan Feminist Movement,

35 BRITISH J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 325 (2008): Stephanie Willman Bordat & Saida Kouzzi, Legal
Empowerment of Unwed Mothers: Experiences of Moroccan AGO 's, IDLO Legal Empowerment
Working
Papers
(No.
14)
(2010),
available
at

http://www.idlo.org/Publications/LEWP/LEWP BordatKouzzi.pdft Katie Zoglin, Morocco's
Family Code: Improving Equalityfor Women, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 964 (2009); and Katja Zvan, The
Politics of the Reform of the New Family Law (the Moudawana). available at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/-metheses/Zvan / 20thesis.pdf (May 2007) (unpublished thesis).
21 See KRISTOF AND WuDUNN, supra note 20, at 240:
Girls in poor countries are particularly undernourished, physically and intellectually. If we educate and feed those girls and give them employment opportunities, then the world as a whole will gain a new infusion of human intelligence - and poor countries will garner citizens and leaders who are better
equipped to address those countries' challenges. The strongest argument we
can make to leaders of poor countries is not a moral one but a pragmatic one:
If they wish to enliven their economies, they had better not leave those seams

of human gold buried and unexploited.
The title of the book refers to the Chinese proverb cited in the book that "Women hold up half the
sky" referenced early in the book, following the title page.
22 See id at 250.
23 See id. at 185 (quoting former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan).
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Court decisions which are the subject of this Article. The problems are not of
the same magnitude and otherwise different. Among other things, with negligible and limited exceptions, no other countries elect judges, and certainly none
do so to the same extent that many states do. Therefore, other countries do not
have the same specific issues raised by Caperton or Citizens United as applied
to their judiciaries and impartiality.2 4 Thus there are no issues of judicial bias as
a result of campaign contributions (although there are always going to be issues
of judicial bias wherever there are judges); and there are no issues of campaign
contributions of any sort fueling inadequate or erroneous campaign advertisements. Nor do other countries have the other troublesome problems associated
with judicial elections, including voters lacking knowledge of the judicial candidates, perhaps knowing nothing more than their names.
The lack of elections, however, does not necessarily make foreign judicial systems (let alone any specific system) superior to ours; other factors must
be considered, including the context. Legal systems elsewhere may be freighted
with other troubles (such as corruption, political interference with the judiciary,25 poorly developed statutes or codes, lack of legal education, inadequate
physical facilities, and other matters). Some may have advantages as well, such
as pre-judicial education. 6
In addition, not all judicial appointment systems are alike, even in the
United States. The principal recommended United States model is referred to as
commission-based appointment or "merit selection. ' 7 In those systems, a
24

Perspectives From the Rule of Law, supra note 18, at 88 ("Popular judicial elections are a

peculiarly American custom."); see also id. (pointing out the negligible extent ofjudicial elections
worldwide); Shugerman, supra note 14, at 1064 ("Judicial elections are uniquely American: even
though many countries have copied other American legal institutions, almost no one else in the
world has ever experimented with the popular election ofjudges.") (footnote omitted). Judges are
nonetheless elected for certain international courts by certain international governmental bodies.
Norman L. Greene, Advancing the Rule of Law through JudicialSelection Reform: Is the New
York Court of Appeals Judicial Selection Process the Least of Our Concerns in New York, 72
ALB. L. REv. 633, 645 n.29 (2009).
25
See generally RULE BY LAW, supra note 6. However, as some of the articles in RULE BY
LAW point out, courts in authoritarian systems are not all necessarily tainted. See, e.g., Lisa Hilbink. Agents ofAnti-Politics: Courts in Pinochet's Chile, in RULE By LAW,supra note 6. at 129
("Just as we should not expect judges in democratic regimes to assert themselves automatically in
defense of rights and the rule of law, so in authoritarian contexts, we should not assume that
judges will always be hopeless tools of the government.").
26
See Marc T. Amy, Judiciary School: A Proposalfor a Pre-JudicialLL.M. Degree, 52 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 130 (2002); Keith R. Fisher, Education for JudicialAspirants, 43 AKRON L. REV.
163 (2010).
27
Perspectives on JudicialSelection. supra note 14, at 959 et seq. For model provisions for
such a system. see generally Norman L. Greene, The JudicialIndependence Through Fair Appointments Act, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.13 (2007); see Roy A. Schotland, Special Interest Influence: Balancing Independence and Accountability: A Pleafor Reality, 74 Mo. L. REV. 507, 512
(2009) [hereinafter Schotland, Special Interest Influence] (referencing the "self-applauding label"
of merit selection); see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial
Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 104 (2009) (noting "growing scho-
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commission governed by rules produces a limited number of nominees for the
executive to appoint, sometimes subject to legislative ratification. After the
expiration of the judge's term, the judge either undergoes the commission
process again or runs in a retention election where the only question is whether
the candidate should be retained. The better-designed systems provide judicial
performance review, such as in Colorado, where the voters receive judicial
evaluations before voting on retention.28
Although the issues might differ across countries, the objectives are
similar, including decision-makers who are competent, efficient, and neutral,
neither biased nor appearing to a reasonable observer to be biased; and judicial
systems need to be designed in order best to achieve these goals.29 Some time
ago, a friend with substantial rule of law experience told me that the efforts to
improve our domestic judiciaries and international judiciaries "are really the
same." 30 On that assumption, this Article will explore the two U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, borrowing frequently from international as well as domestic

sources.
E.

JudicialImpartialityas a FundamentalPartof the Rule of Law

International and domestic principles of the rule of law, including the
internationally respected modelf3 1 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct,
larly consensus in favor of 'merit selection,"' and the "adoption of judicial councils" internationally).
28

Perspectives on JudicialSelection, supranote 14, at 958 et seq.

29

Some rule of law efforts abroad historically were motivated by attracting foreign investment

and may have been more rhetorical than real. See Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicializationof Politics in Egypt, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 6, at 146-47

("Egyptian government officials were keen to bring judicial reforms to the attention of the international business community whenever possible.... There was, of course. a significant gap between
the government's rule of law rhetoric and the operation of judicial institutions on the ground....
[T]he disparity between rhetoric and reality was particularly significant through the 1970s when
the regime sought to attract private investment without placing any practical constraints on its
power."). The lack of "credible legal institutions" hurt the Egyptian economy in the 1950's as
"private investors understandably hesitated to make major new investments in the economy.

Instead, foreign and Egyptian capitalists actively divested their assets, depriving the Egyptian
economy of large sums of capital." Id. at 133.
30

Perspectives From the Rule of Law, supra note 18, at 54 (reciting conversation).

II

The Bangalore Principles are intended to be adaptable to various jurisdictions and provide a

"framework for regulating judicial conduct." See

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME.

COMMENTARY ON THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 36 (2007) [hereinafter
BANGALORE COMMENTARY]:

The statement of principles which follows, and which is based on six fundamental and universal values, together with the statements on the application of
each principle, are intended to provide guidance to judges and to afford the
judiciary a framework for regulating judicial conduct, whether through a na-

tional code of conduct or other mechanism. The statements on the application
of each principle have been designed not to be of so general a nature as to be
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require that judges be impartial.32 To the same effect are the United Nations
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,33 noting that judges shall decide
"impartially... without any improper influences, inducements ... for any reason." 34 The United States Supreme Court has recognized "a litigant's due
process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. 35 The lack of bias is a

of little guidance. nor so specific as to be irrelevant to the numerous and varied issues which a judge faces in his or her daily life. They may. however.
need to be adapted to suit the circumstances of each jurisdiction.
The Bangalore Principles are also available at: THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2002),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial group/Bangaloreprinciples.pdf
[hereinafter BANGALORE PRINCIPLES].
3
BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 31. at Value 2 ("Impartiality is essential to the proper
discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by
which the decision is made .... ). See BANGALORE COMMENTARY. supra note 31. at 5:
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct have increasingly been accepted
by the different sectors of the global judiciary and by international agencies
interested in the integrity of the judicial process. In the result, the Bangalore
Principles are seen more and more as a document which all judiciaries and legal systems can accept unreservedly. In short, these principles give expression to the highest traditions relating to the judicial function as visualised in
all cultures and legal systems.
3
See David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of
Law in Post-Conflict Societies. 19 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 29, 46 (2006) ("In 1985. the U.N. promulgated a concise set of universally recognized principles of judicial independence that describe the
core elements essential to any modern judicial system. The United Nations Basic Principles on
the Independence of the Judiciary ('BPIJ'), was endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in two
resolutions.") (footnotes omitted).
34
Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence
of the Judiciary 2 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/rol/docs/judicial reform un principles
independencejudiciary english.pdf ("The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially,
on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences,
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any
reason.") (cited in Perspectives From the Rule of Law. supra note 18, at 54); see also id. (citing
Sam Rugege, JudicialIndependence in Rwanda, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J.
411, 411. 415 (2007) (noting the relationship between the rule of law, judicial independence and
impartiality as well as economic progress: "Judicial independence is a universally recognized
principle in democratic societies. It is a prerequisite for a society to operate on the basis of the rule
of law[;]" and citing the Asian Development Bank for the following proposition connecting independence with impartiality:
The cornerstone of successful reform is the effective independence of the judiciary. That is a prerequisite for an impartial, efficient and reliable judicial
system. Without judicial independence, there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law the conditions are not in place for the efficient operation of
an open economy, so as to ensure conditions of legal security and foreseeability.
Id. at 415.).
3s
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876. 910 (2010).
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and an "indispensable feature of democracy.

'37

Judges must also appear to be impartial (or unbiased), 38 deciding "disputes between parties on a case-by-case basis according to the applicable facts and
law . . . ,39
While personal corruption is certainly a problem, the appearance of judicial bias - or what could be called "perceived corruption" - is also a problem. Many legal systems view this latter type of corruption as equally dangerous, particularly because
it causes public distrust in the judiciary. Public confidence is vital to a well-functioning judiciary, so regardless of whether actual bias exists, the appearance can be sufficient to remove a
judge from a particular case.4 °
As previously noted, Justice John Paul Stevens has observed, "It is confidence
in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true back41
law.,
of
rule
the
of
bone
The Bangalore Principles note that "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or
herself from participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to
36

Gary

Slapper.

The Law Explored. Judicial Bias, TIMEs ONLINE.

July 11.

2007.

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/columnists/article2058563.ece:
see European
Court of Human Rights, Esa Kiiskinen & Mikko Kovalainen v. Finland, Application No. 2623/95,
at 7 ("[T]here are two aspects to the requirement of impartiality .... First, the tribunal must be
subjectively impartial, that is, no member of the tribunal should hold any personal prejudice or
bias. ...Secondly, the tribunal must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must
offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect .....
3
Elizabeth B. Wydra. The FourteenthAmendment's Due Process Clause and Caperton: Placing the Federalism Debate in HistoricalContext, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 239, 241 (2010) ("[A] fair
and impartial judiciary has been an indispensable feature of democracy. The judicial insistence on
unbiased adjudicators goes back at least as far as the early seventeenth century common law, and
was invoked by the eighteenth-century American Founders.") (footnotes omitted).
38 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 831 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[T]he assurance of impartiality ...

is the fundamental requirement of due process.").

3
Charles Gardner Geyh. Why JudicialElections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 65 (2003). Geyh
writes:
But impartiality is not an end in itself. It is an instrumental value designed to
preserve a different end altogether: the rule of law. If the ultimate goal is to
enable judges to uphold the rule of law (i.e.. to resolve disputes between parties on a case-by-case basis according to the applicable facts and law). then a
judge who locks herself into a particular position on the parties, the law, or the
facts before a case is heard plainly undermines that goal.
See id.
40
Kevin J. Mitchell, Neither Purse Nor Sword: Lessons Europe Can Learn From American
Courts' Struggle For Democratic Legitimacy, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 653, 656-57 (20062007) (footnote omitted).
41
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens' quote is
one of the three introducing this article.
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decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially., 42 "[T]here is an aspiration in the hearts of all men and women for the rule of law. That aspiration
depends for its fulfilment on the competent and impartial application of the law
by judges. 4 3 "[T]he purpose of impartiality is to uphold the rule of law. 44
The consequences of lack of impartiality are self-evident. For example,
if a judge rules in favor of A not B in a case involving money damages because
of actual bias (and not because of the law), the judge has taken money from B
that belongs to B and given it to A. Otherwise stated, the judge has misappropriated property under the color of law, and that is a rule of law violation. In
addition, if a judge who is reasonably believed to be biased rules in favor of A
rather than B, that in itself is a rule of law violation, to the extent that "confidence" in the justice system is lost and the system is degraded, 45 and citizens
will distrust and cease to see courts as places where justice is done or view the
"courts of law" and "courts of justice" as two different places.46 The rule of law

42

BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 2.5.

43

See BANGALORE COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 27 (citing Sir Gerard Brennan, Chief
Justice of Australia, Judicial Independence, The Australian Judicial Conference, 2 Nov. 1996.

Canberra).
44
BANGALORE PRINCIPLES. supra note 31. at 2.5: see also Tolbert & Solomon, supra note 33,
at 47:
With some input in the selection process from the judiciary itself through
judicial qualification commissions, judicial appointments should be made on
the basis of objective criteria in order to foster the selection of independent,
impartial. and well-qualified judges. Similarly, judges should be appointed for
fixed terms that provide guaranteed tenure. Justice sector reform efforts
should also seek to raise the qualifications of judges and judicial personnel
through training, including the establishment of judicial training centers.
Measures must be adopted to provide the judiciary with adequate resources
and sufficient judicial personnel to manage caseloads and dispose of cases in a
timely and efficient manner. Finally, efforts must be made to strengthen the
role of judicial associations that promote the interests of the profession and
encourage compliance with ethical standards.
45

JEFFREY M. SHARMAN, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

DEPARTMENT STATE, GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY DIVISION, JUDICIAL REFORM ROUNDTABLE

II, JUDICIAL ETHICS: INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY, AND INTEGRITY 8-9 (1996) ("Hence, judges
are expected to avoid not only actual partiality, but the appearance of it as well, because the appearance of a judge who is not impartial diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and degrades the justice system.").
46
See Slapper, supra note 36:
In 1920, a judge told a London taxi driver to take him to "the courts of justice." "Where's that?" the cabbie asked. "The law courts," said the judge.
"Oh, I know," said the driver "but it ain't the same thing."
It is true that justice and law are not the same territory but some ideas of justice are in the heart of British law. It's a cardinal principle of justice that a
judge must not be biased. Laws must be applied impartially. Like an imbalanced set of weighing scales, a biased judge will give an unreliable result.
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will be the loser if parties dispute adverse judgments as "rendered in biased
courts., 47 "Far worse, negative perceptions about the justice system encourage
citizens to resort to violent, extralegal and possibly criminal practices to secure
their rights., 48 "If private citizens perceive that judges are not impartial, it is
likely that courts will not be relied upon as the ultimate fora for dispute resolution. 49 In some circumstances, this may cause a "descent into chaos," according to a Kenyan appellate judge. 0
In the international context, it has been observed that failed trust in justice is "lethal for democracy and development," and "what is at stake is the trust
that the courts must inspire in those who are brought before them in a democratic society." 51 "If the law or the courts are perceived as partisan or arbitrary in
their application, the effectiveness of the judicial system in providing social
order will be reduced., 52 In order for the public to accept an independent 53 judi-

47

Shepard, supra note 16, at 1067. Chief Justice Shepard observed specifically:
[J]udges must not only be impartial in fact, they must appearto be impartial.
If private citizens perceive that judges are not impartial, it is likely that courts
will not be relied upon as the ultimate fora for dispute resolution. Society's
commitment to the rule of law may be irreparably damaged if losing litigants
do not respect adverse judgments because they perceive them to have been
rendered in biased courts. Thus, rules that restrain favoritism, conflict of interest, prejudgment and the like help ensure that courts are perceived as even-

handed institutions.
Id.
48

See Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in TransitionalSocieties: An Analysis of the Problems
and Failuresof the Judiciaryin Nigeria, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 9, 19 (2005).
49
Shepard, supra note 16, at 1067.
50
See Fran Quigley, Growing Political Will from the Grassroots:How Social Movement Principles Can Reverse the Dismal Legacy of Rule of Law Interventions. 41 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 13. 35 (2009):
As Kenyan High Court Judge Mary A. Ang'awa wrote, the lack of faith in the justice system played a large role in the descent into chaos:
When the results were announced, the losers felt cheated and were angry.
When they were told, "If you are not satisfied with the election results, go to
court and challenge them," they responded, "We have no confidence in the judiciary; we refuse to go to court."
51 BANGALORE COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 17 ("Looking beyond the acts themselves, the
fact that the public in some countries tends to view the judiciary as a corrupt authority is particularly serious: a lack of trust in justice is lethal for democracy and development and encourages the
perpetuation of corruption. Here, the rules ofjudicial ethics take on major importance. As the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights stresses, judges must not only meet objective criteria
of impartiality but must also be seen to be impartial: what is at stake is the trust that the courts
must inspire in those who are brought before them in a democratic society.") (emphasis omitted).
52 See Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin
Center for Business Ethics Research as Amiei Curiae In Support of Petitioners in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co.. 2009 WL 45977 (Jan. 2. 2009) (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 129 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002)):
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ciary, they need to have a judiciary which they believe to be impartial; 54 and for
a judiciary to be impartial, it needs to be independent,5 5 free of threats or inducements by political or other forces to decide one way or another. In one
reported instance, a Chinese judge was threatened with lack of promotion and
the loss of her children's educational opportunities (child will be "a labourer all

As spending escalates, judicial elections more and more appear to be a tool of
the wealthy and powerful. casting doubt on the impartiality and legitimacy of
the judicial system overall. "A judiciary independent from both government
intervention and influence by the parties in a dispute provides the single greatest institutional support for the rule of law. If the law or the courts are perceived as partisan or arbitrary in their application, the effectiveness of the
judicial system in providing social order will be reduced."
(footnote omitted)).
53
Judicial independence and judicial impartiality are sometimes thought of together as related
concepts. See, e.g.. Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root. The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan:
The Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 Mo. L. REV. 711, 717 (2009)
("Judicial independence refers to the essential requirement that judges be impartial and free independent of political or sectarian influence. Such independence is not inconsistent with accountability, as some have suggested, but rather it requires accountability, for judges who fail to
be impartial
who intentionally impose their own views rather than their good faith beliefs in
what the law requires
should be held to account for their failures.") (footnotes omitted).
Judges may be impartial, however, but to some extent and in certain circumstances not independent. See Christopher M. Larkins, JudicialIndependence and Democratization: A Theoretical
and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 612 (1996), observing as follows:
Judges may be impartial but not insulated; they may have the mindset to act
objectively when dealing with the behavior of powerful political and social
actors, but will pay the price if and when they attempt to do so. Likewise,
judges may be impartial but have no scope of authority with which to challenge the legality of certain agents' actions. In actuality, both insularity and
scope of authority may be lacking while judges remain impartial. Under these
circumstances, notwithstanding the high degree of impartiality, it would be
less than accurate to label such judges independent.
Id.
54
See Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal
Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 359, 369 (2005) ("Judicial independence is indispensable to a lawbased society. Many important structural safeguards facilitate judicial independence, such as
lifetime tenure and nonremovability until a certain retirement age. But judicial independence also
depends on public support for the judiciary as an institution, and to earn that support the judiciary
must appear scrupulously impartial in its decision making. Together with fidelity to the law, impartiality is a means of ensuring the accountability of an independent judiciary in a democratic
society and in the international community.").
55
See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the Role of the
World Bank, in THE

WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS AND LECTURES

147,

159 (Ibrahim F.I. Shihata et al. eds., 1993) ("While the independence of the judiciary is an important element of a judicial reform program, it should be recalled, however, that such independence
is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to achieve the goal of the impartiality of the judge and
the fairness of judicial procedures.").
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his life") were she to disregard the directions of the political boss on how a particular case should be decided. 56
She then noted that westerners should not second-guess how she responded to the threats: "'What do you western judges say I must do in these
circumstances?"'57 (The judge did not reveal how she responded to the threats.)
Another observed that in Nigeria, "[m]ost judges have succumbed to the notion
that career development depends58 on how they rule, especially in high profile
cases involving the government.,
56

For the threats to the Chinese judge and her family in order to influencing her decision-

making, see the

HONOURABLE JUSTICE DAVID IPP AO, MAINTAINING THE TRADITION OF JUDICIAL

available
at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlinl/Supreme Court/
11sc.nsf/vwFiles/ipp211108.pdf/Sfile/ipp211108.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010), as follows:
She [the Chinese judge] explained that, usually, she had no trouble from the
government, or people in power. But, three or four times a year she would receive a telephone call from a person who was very important politically in the
city (in other words, one or other of the political bosses). She would be reminded that the next day she would be hearing some particular case which the
man would identify. The man would tell her that the case concerned one of
his family members or friends or business or political associates. He would
say that this person must win the case. When the judge protested. the man
would warn her. He would say: "If this person doesn't win the case, not only
will you never be promoted but we know all about your child, your only child.
If this person doesn't win the case, your child - who is presently in primary
school - will never get into the stream to go to university. He will be a la-

IMPARTIALITY,

bourer all his life. Your child will never receive a proper education. He will

have to leave school at 15 years of age and go and work in the fields." The
judge gave me a piercing look and said: "What do you western judges say I
must do in these circumstances"?
To the same effect, see also F. Andrew Hanssen, The PoliticalEconomy of Judicial Selection:
Theory and Evidence, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 413 (2000); see, e.g., id at 418 ("Are there
groups today that judges might be a little leery about displeasing? It depends on the institutional
structure, and whether that structure gives particular groups the means to affect a judge's career.").
57
HONOURABLE JUSTICE DAVID IPP AO,supra note 56.
58

Oko, supra note 48, at 73-74:

In a system where judges are fearful of the executive, it is futile to expect
them to exercise the level of independence needed for them to engage in impartial and dispassionate resolution of conflicts. The climate of intimidation,
manipulation and control of the judiciary by the executive often forces judges
to engage in a cost-benefit analysis with potentially disastrous consequences
for the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Judges have to choose between commitment to justice and risking the ire of the executive or demonstrating their fealty to the executive. Most judges have succumbed to the notion that career development depends on how they rule, especially in high profile cases involving the government. Judges cast in this mold prefer to demonstrate their loyalty to the executive, sacrificing the dictates of justice in an attempt to appease the executive, and thus, maintain their viability in the system.
(footnotes omitted).
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These are only two of many examples. 5 9 Describing a lack of judicial
independence, another writer hypothetically observed as follows: "You render
decisions that [the ruler] likes, you get a big house, a nice fancy carriage with
fancy horses, a lot of servants to wait on you. If you render a decision he
doesn't like, he cuts your head off. So that is the institutional structure: good
decision, nice house and carriage; bad decision, no head. 60 Also, "[t]here are
many ways in which a determined executive faction may secure the outcomes it
wishes short of threatening or firing judges ....
61 Sometimes rulers may seek
to "ensure that only cooperative judges have good careers. 62 Judges concerned
about their careers and even their personal safety "temper justice with self preservation., 63 "At least in authoritarian states, judicial independence is not a
given. 6 4 Judicial independence is not a given in the United States either, although the reasons may differ.65
59

See generally RULE By LAW, supra note 6. With respect to judicial impartiality in Nigeria,
see also Oko, supra note 48, at 17-19:
Most politicians are neither committed to the establishment of a strong, virile
and independent judiciary, nor do they believe that the judiciary should have
the power to review legislative and executive decisions. Some elected officials have a distorted view of the judiciary as an extension of the executive
branch of government. This mindset encourages attempts to control and manipulate the judiciary and to turn judges into "pliable instruments of state power." The pervasive influence of the executive, its powers of retaliation and
ability to advance or hamper a judge's career make it difficult for judges to
adjudicate disputes without fear or favor as required by their oath. Judges
concerned about their careers and even their personal safety "temper justice
with self preservation."
For most Nigerians, the judicial process is nothing more than an auction in
which justice goes to the highest bidder. Convinced that judges decide cases
on the basis of connections and gratification without regard to the legal merits
of the case, citizens seek to influence the outcome of cases either by "settling
the judge." or intimidating judicial officers. Far worse, negative perceptions
about the justice system encourage citizens to resort to violent, extralegal and
possibly criminal practices to secure their rights. Popular distrust of the judiciary has fueled needless attacks on the integrity and the institution of the judiciary.
(footnotes omitted).
Hanssen, supra note 56. at 417.
61 Jennifer Widner & Daniel Scher, Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democracies:
60

Uganda and Zimbabwe, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 6, at 235.

62

Peter H. Solomon, Jr., JudicialPower in AuthoritarianStates: The Russian Experience, in

RULE BY LAW, supra note 6, at 262.

63

See also Oko. supra note 48.

64

Peter H. Solomon, Jr., JudicialPower in AuthoritarianStates: The Russian Experience, in

RULE BY LAW, supra note 6. at 261.

Security of tenure, good salaries, good financial support of the courts, and
judicial control of key aspects of court administration are recognized as neces-
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I. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, AND CAPERTON
Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself
"when a person with a personal stake in a particularcase had
a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the
judge on the case by raisingfunds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The
remedy of recusalwas based on a litigant's due process right to
a fair trialbefore an unbiasedjudge. ,66

"Though n[o] ... bribe or criminal influence" was involved,
we recognized that "Justice Benjamin [i.e., the judge sought to
be recused] would neverthelessfeel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship [i.e., the person responsiblefor the contributions and
expenditures] for his extraordinaryefforts to get him elected. "
Ibid. "The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias," we further
noted, "simply underscore the needfor objective rules, " rules
which will perforce turn on the appearance of bias rather than
its actualexistence.67
A.

The Decisions in Caperton
1.

Justice Benjamin Refuses to Recuse Himself

The underlying facts in Caperton are of little relevance to the principal
activity of the case which led to the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. That
activity principally turns on the issue of whether a particular judge, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Brent Benjamin, should have participated in the appeal of a $50 million verdict won by Caperton against Massey.
The underlying case involved a lawsuit among two coal companies and others,
one (Caperton) claiming that the other (Massey) intentionally destroyed its
business. Described more colorfully by others (including the alleged reasons for

sary conditions for judges to render impartial decisions. But they may not be
sufficient, especially when judicial bureaucracies create strong incentives for
judges to conform to the wishes of political masters and informal institutions
support this behavior.
Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
65
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2252 (2009).
66
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (citing Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (citations omitted).
67
Id. at 967 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
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the destruction),68 the facts were stated by the U.S. Supreme Court quickly, as
follows:
In August 2002 a West Virginia jury returned a verdict that
found respondents A. T. Massey Coal Co. and its affiliates (hereinafter Massey) liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference with existing contractual relations. The jury awarded petitioners Hugh Caperton, Harman
Development Corp., Harman Mining Corp., and Sovereign Coal
Sales (hereinafter Caperton) the sum of $50 million in compensatory and punitive damages. In June 2004 the state trial court
denied Massey's posttrial motions challenging the verdict and
the damages award, finding that Massey "intentionally acted in
utter disregard of [Caperton's] rights and ultimately destroyed
[Caperton's] businesses because, after conducting cost benefit
analyses,
[Massey] concluded it was in its financial interest to
69
do so.",

Rather than a dispute between coal companies, Caperton, therefore,
mainly involved Caperton's attempt to recuse Justice Benjamin from hearing the
case, based on the contribution to Benjamin of his principal and major campaign
contributor, the CEO of defendant Massey, Don Blankenship. According to the
rules, Benjamin heard the recusal motion and decided he could fairly hear the
70
case, issuing a lengthy opinion explaining his reasons for not recusing himself.
In his opinion, among other things, he noted:
Insofar as all state judicial offices are filled through the electoral process, every judicial officer in this state is subject to having
to decide the merits of a case that involves a party or attorney
who contributed to or supported, or, conversely, opposed his or
her campaign for office.71

68

Aasty

See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Caperton's Coal: The Battle Over an Appalachian Mine Exposes a
Vein
in
Bench
Politics,
ABA
J.,
Feb.
1,
2009,
available
at

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/capertons coal:
"On the day of the closing, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, they called the whole

69

7o

deal off," Caperton recalls. "They tanked us at the last second. It forced us into bankruptcy." So after a stop at the federal bankruptcy court to file a Chapter 11 petition, he hauled Massey into West Virginia state court on various allegations of fraud and tortious contract interference. He won a $50 million
jury verdict.
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008).

Id. at 303 (Benjamin. Acting C.J., concurring) (refusing to recuse himself from the hearing
of the case).

71
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The "campaign contributions" - virtually all independent expenditures
amounted to over $3 million and were lawful, but were made at a time that
the contributor Blankenship knew that the case was coming before the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and that if Justice Benjamin were elected,
the case would come before him.i (The U.S. Supreme Court grouped the independent expenditures and contributions together as if they should all be considered "contributions," without explaining the reasons for this.) 73 The payments
were generally discoverable through West Virginia's campaign finance disclosure requirements] 4 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
-

The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions,
the justice's election, and the pendency of the case is also critical. It was reasonably foreseeable, when the campaign contributions were made, that the pending case would be before the
newly elected justice. The $50 million adverse jury verdict had
been entered before the election, and the [West Virginia] Supreme Court of Appeals was the next step once the state trial
court dealt with post-trial motions. So it became at once apparent that, absent recusal, Justice Benjamin would review a judgment that cost his biggest donor's company $50 million.75

72

It was fortunate for Caperton that he was able to learn the extent of the expenditures that

were made by Blankenship. since that is not always possible. See Schotland. Special Interest
Influence. supra note 27.
Disclosure of contributions to independent spending efforts: ...in nearly all
states disclosure of contributors to independent spending efforts is not required or the requirement applies only to "express advocacy." . .. Supreme
courts should promulgate a rule requiring parties and counsel in a lawsuit to
certify that all their campaign contributions and expenditures with respect to
the sitting judge's campaign(s) within the past X years are set forth in an affidavit filed in that case.
Id. at 526.
73 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualificationin the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 247, 262-63 (2010).
[Justice] Kennedy never explains why he blurred the distinction between contributions and expenditures. All we know is that Kennedy acknowledges (only
once) that Blankenship engaged in "independent expenditure." But then, a
dozen times he repeatedly re-labels these "independent expenditures" as "contributions." He discusses the precedent in disqualification cases, and quotes
the relevant portions of those cases as referring to "contributions" to the
judge. not independent expenditures. Yet, he treats the two words as synonyms and never explains why.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
74 The relevant disclosure statute is W.VA. CODE § 3-8-1 et seq. Cf Schotland, Special Interest Influence, supra note 27, at 526.
75 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256 (2009).
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Most of the money was given by Blankenship to a political organization
(referred to as a "527") known to be supporting Benjamin and opposing his opponent, called "And for the Sake of the Kids [hereinafter ASK]."6 The contributions far exceeded all other amounts spent on behalf of Benjamin. The U.S.
Supreme Court observed the following about the sums involved:
Blankenship contributed some $3 million to unseat the incumbent and replace him with Benjamin. His contributions eclipsed
the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and exceeded by 300% the amount spent by Benjamin's campaign
committee ....
Caperton claims Blankenship spent $1 million
more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees
of both candidates combined.77
Justice Benjamin, commenting on the motion to recuse him with a degree of incredulity, focused on why he should be recused for "independent expenditures" since he had nothing to do with them.78 In his opinion on the recusal question, he posed the problem as he saw it as follows:
76

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, in "addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory

maximum to Benjamin's campaign committee, Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to 'And
For The Sake Of The Kids,' a political organization formed under 26 U. S. C. § 527." Id. at 2257.
With respect to such 527's, see, e.g., Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem ... and the Buckley
Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 949, 949 (2005).
"In the world of campaign finance, 2004 was without a doubt the year of the
527 organization. No other aspect of campaign financing received as much
press coverage or public attention as the rise of the 527s. Expenditures by
527s - named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code under which
they are organized - active in federal elections amounted to at least $ 405
million, accounting for more than one-tenth of total federal election spending
and perhaps twenty to twenty-five percent of spending in the presidential
campaign."

Id.
77
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264. Fortunately for Caperton, the amount of the campaign contributions were known, but that would not be true in all jurisdictions where judges are elected. To
the extent that the contributions are unknown, making a motion to recuse on the basis of contributions would be much harder, if not impossible.
78
For a description of the difference between contributions and independent expenditures, see

Rotunda, supra note 73, at 261:
... Blankenship personally spent a lot of his own money (what the Court calls
"independent expenditures") to attack Benjamin's opponent. Moreover, these
expenditures were truly "independent." No one argued that Blankenship coordinated with Justice Benjamin's campaign or even that Blankenship and Benjamin were friends.
The distinction between "contributions"
giving money to. or coordinating
with the candidate - and "expenditures" - spending one's own money to
advocate what one feels like advocating - is hardly technical. It is of constitutional dimension. Independent expenditures - those not coordinated with
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The primary thrust of the Appellees' argument is not that I
should be disqualified because a party or attorney to the instant
case directly contributed to my campaign. The Appellees' argument is that I should be disqualified because, without my
knowledge, direction or control, an independent nonparty organization, ASK, received contributions from people or groups
that included an employee of a party in this case [namely, Blankenship, CEO of Massey], and ASK independently used its contributions to wage a campaign against my opponent four years
79
ago.
In support of his position, Benjamin cited opinions raising a concern
about extensive recusals in states where judges are elected. According to the
these opinions, if judges who received contributions from or on behalf of litigants or their counsel would recuse themselves, there would be many recusals;
and such contributions are therefore generally considered insufficient to
the candidate
are constitutionally protected as free speech ....In contrast,
the state has much greater leeway in regulating and limiting contributions.
79 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223, 303 (2008) (Benjamin,
Acting C.J., concurring) (refusing to recuse himself from the hearing of the case). Similarly
underscoring that most of the payments on which the Supreme Court focused were independent in
nature, see Rotunda, supra note 73, at 266:
Given this merging of contributions and expenditures [by the U.S. Supreme
Court], there is little the judge can do to avoid disqualification. He cannot reject the "contribution" because there is no contribution to reject or accept. He
cannot change the content of these attack-advertisements because, by hypothesis, these third-party expenditures are not his expenditures they are truly
"independent."
The attorneys for Massey in Caperton, who lost in the U.S. Supreme Court, observed that the
Supreme Court and others combined Blankenship's contributions and expenditures in order to
create one large payment of over $3 million and thereby created a "compelling narrative." See
Andrew L. Frey & Jeffrey A. Berger, The Disconnect Between the Outcome in Caperton and the
Circumstances of Justice Benjamin's Election, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 279. 291 92 (2010). This
"narrative" was an important factor leading to Massey's defeat:
Many amici also trumpeted the headline-grabbing simple story. They too focused almost exclusively on the amount of money spent, overlooked the difference between direct contributions and independent expenditures. and disregarded various nuances, such as the amount of money spent opposing Justice Benjamin and the impact of McGraw's behavior on the outcome .... In
the end, the narrative shaped by the petitioners, and amplified by the media
and amici, affected the outcome- the simple story prevailed and the headline
trumped the details. The mantra of "CEO buys judge for $3 million" has a
shock-the-conscience salience that was difficult to overcome. It proved irresistible to many. including five members of the Court, and it clearly fueled the
Court's result. The success of the simple story in Caperton reinforces a principle that veteran Supreme Court litigators understand well: legal reasoning
goes a long way, but a compelling narrative can make the difference.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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mandate recusal.80 Thus, he concluded that independent expenditures by their
very nature are insufficient to warrant recusal:
Direct contributions to a judicial candidate's campaign are an
insufficient basis, alone, to require disqualification. Therefore,
contributions by a third-person to a completely independent
campaign - with no ties to the judicial candidate - do not rise
to a due process requirement of disqualification."'
As both the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court noted, "[the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct requires a
judge to 'disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' 8 2
Following the hearing of the case, Justice Benjamin was the deciding
vote in a 3-2 decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in favor

80

See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799. 802 (Tex.

App. 1993)):
If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing lawyer is involved as
counsel, judges who have been elected would have to recuse themselves in
perhaps a majority of the cases filed in their courts. Perhaps the next step
would be to require a judge to recuse himself in any case in which one of the
lawyers had refused to contribute or, worse still, had contributed to that
judge's opponent.
See also Caperton. 679 S.E.2d at 305 (citing Adair v. State Dep't of Education, 474 Mich. 1027.
709 N.W.2d 567 (2006)):
That a judge has at some time received a campaign contribution from a party,
an attorney for a party, a law firm employing an attorney for a party. or a
group having common interests with a party or an attorney, cannot reasonably
require his or her disqualification. For there is no justice in Michigan in modern times who has not received campaign contributions from such persons.
See also Caperton. 679 S.E.2d at 303 (citing Public Citizen v. Bomer, 115 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746
(W.D. Tex. 2000)):
"[C]ampaign contributions by parties with cases pending before the judicial
candidate or by attorneys who regularly practice before them is not so irregular or 'extreme' as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
81 Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 306 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring) (refusing to recuse himself
from the hearing of the case).
82
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009); see also Caperton,
679 S.E.2d at 295 (citing Canon 3E(1)). The principles for impartiality in West Virginia thus
approximate those in the Bangalore Principles. BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at 2.5.
The effectiveness of the impartiality requirement evidently does not depend exclusively on how
the requirement is worded but rather how it is interpreted and enforced. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court and Justice Benjamin both had the same principle before them and came out differently.
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of Massey dismissing the $50 million trial verdict in favor of Caperton. 83
U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
2.

897

The

The U.S. Supreme Court's Majority Decision

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that Benjamin should
have recused himself in light of the timing and actual and relative magnitude of
the contributions and that his decision to hear the case violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted:
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias - based
on objective and reasonable perceptions - when a person with
a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of
money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in
the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on
the outcome of the election. . . . Applying this principle, we
conclude that Blankenship's campaign efforts had a significant
and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on
the case.84
With respect to timing (and significance), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that it was clear that the Caperton case would come before Benjamin at
the time the contributions were made:
The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions,
the justice's election, and the pendency of the case is also critical. It was reasonably foreseeable, when the campaign contributions were made, that
the pending case would be before the
85
newly elected justice.

83

That Justice Benjamin was the deciding vote on a 3 2 decision should not be a significant

point in future recusal cases involving appellate judges. Even if he was only one of a more substantial majority (such as 5 0 or 4 1), Justice Benjamin's participation still may have tainted the
process. See Karlan, supra note 14, at 102 ("Justice Benjamin's participation would have tainted
the impartial administration of justice even if the state court had upheld the jury's verdict by a
vote of four to one with Justice Benjamin in the dissent or had overturned the verdict by a supermajority that included him. Indeed, the latter possibility might actually have been more troubling
to the extent that the lineup was a function of his powers of persuasion over his colleagues.").
84
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64.
85 Id. at 2256.
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Focusing on the "extreme" facts as it saw them, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected claims that the decision would lead to a "flood of recusal motions."
Since, according to the Court, the facts would be unlikely to recur, requests for
such relief would be rare:
Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation where
the Constitution requires recusal. Massey and its amici predict
that various adverse consequences will follow from recognizing
a constitutional violation here ranging from a flood of recusal
motions to unnecessary interference with judicial elections. We
disagree. The facts now before us are extreme by any measure.
The parties point to no other instance involving judicial campaign contributions that presents a potential for bias comparable
to the circumstances in this case. 86
And the U.S. Supreme Court rescued Caperton from his predicament by
granting recusal.
3.

The Chief Justice's Dissent

The Caperton majority and the principal dissent by Chief Justice Roberts disagreed on the consequences of recusal, including whether there was a
danger of a "flood" of recusal motions. Among other things, through posing a
list of forty questions," Chief Justice Roberts contended that the rules set forth
by the majority are too vague, that they would encourage baseless recusal
claims, and that they would result in systemic damage to the courts:
The Court's new "rule" provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required. This
will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are
biased, however groundless those charges may be. The end result will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.88

86

Id. at 2265.

87

Jeffrey W. Stempel. Playing Forty Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts's Concerns in
Caperton and Some Tentative Answers About OperationalizingJudicialRecusal and Due Process,

39 S.W.L. REv. 1. 8 (2009) ("Seriatim review of the dissent's laundry list [of questions] establishes
that the at-first impressive array of concerns proves unpersuasive and alarmist.").
88
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
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He was not persuaded by the majority's reference to the case being "extreme" and, therefore, its suggestion that Caperton recusals and recusal motions
would be rare. 89 Rather, he foresaw many recusal motions:
To its credit, the Court seems to recognize that the inherently
boundless nature of its new rule poses a problem. But the majority's only answer is that the present case is an "extreme" one,
so there is no need to worry about other cases. Ante, at 17. The
Court repeats this point over and over. See ante, at 13 ("this is
an exceptional case"); ante, at 16 ("On these extreme facts");
ibid. ("Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation"); ante, at 17 ("The facts now before us are extreme by any
measure"); ante, at 20 (Court's rule will "be confined to rare instances"). 90
In an interesting aside, Chief Justice Roberts noted that perhaps Justice
Benjamin should have recused himself. But according to the Chief Justice, it
was better for the Supreme Court to leave the judge in place than grant recusal
relief, since directing recusal would inevitably lead to a plethora of recusal motions in future cases and reduce confidence in the courts:
I am sure there are cases where a "probability of bias" should
lead the prudentjudge to step aside, but the judge fails to do so.
Maybe this is one of them. But I believe that opening the door
to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous "probability of bias," will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the
American people in the fairness and integrity of their courts. 91
Or as Justice Scalia noted in his separate dissent as well:
The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs
and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the
quest cannot succeed - which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable. 92

89
A commentator noted that "Caperton does tell us that constitutionally-mandated recusals
will be rare, but it does not tell us why." Rotunda. supra note 73, at 278.
90
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
91
Id. at 2274.
92
Id. at 2275 (Scalia. J. dissenting).
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Justice in the Individual Case vs. Systemic Needs
If the result of federalism is that a litigant needs to have his
case decided by an apparently biasedjudge, what purpose does
federalism serve there?

The Roberts dissent saw tension between doing justice in the individual
case and doing what is best for the court system. According to the dissent, it
was better for Caperton to have borne his burden alone - and presumably have
been a good sport about it and done so in good spirits 93 - because (in the Chief
Justice's view) of systemic needs.
In essence, Caperton would be told, "Sorry, we cannot provide you with
an impartial judge, because if we give you one, there will be potential problems
with other litigants in the future." This is an example of one part of our government telling the aggrieved litigant that "it's not my job" to address its problem and leaving the litigant without a remedy where no other part of government has accepted the job either.94
The Chief Justice's reference to "an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case" is only a euphemistic way to describe leaving Caperton before an
apparently biased judge. For Caperton, the phrase "isolated failure" means
nothing - this is his case and his money, and he presumably did not have many
cases either. According to the Chief Justice's dissent, principle tops justice in
the individual (Caperton) case:
Extreme cases often test the bounds of established legal principles. There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case, rather than adhering to the legal principle. That cost
has been demonstrated so often that it is captured in a legal
aphorism: "Hard cases make bad law." 9'

93

Caperton reminds us, however, that a victory on a recusal motion is not a victory in the

case. The decision on a recusal motion only relates to the need to appear before a biased or apparently biased judge, rather than a loss or victory on the merits.
94
How might a patient on the fourth floor of a hospital feel if a doctor assigned to the third
floor of a hospital refused to treat him because he's on the fourth floor, even though there were no
doctors assigned to the third floor? See also James Sample. Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 293, 295 (2010) ("The implication [in the Caperton dis-

sents] is that while ethical rules and judicial prudence counseled Benjamin's recusal, Benjamin's
lack of compliance was simply Caperton's 'tough luck."'); Stempel. supra note 87, at 6 ("The
Roberts dissent embraces an almost indefensible position (that the Court should just let it go when
the public could reasonably suspect that a litigant succeeded on appeal by 'buying' a key judge
through massive campaign support)").
95

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (Roberts, C.J. dis-

senting). To the same effect is Professor Lawrence Lessig's view that although Justice Benjamin

should have recused himself, the Supreme Court was wrong to intervene to require his recusal,
speculating that there would be much future Caperton litigation as a result of the intervention.
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The "hard case/bad law" phrase, if used to deny Caperton relief, would
have made "very bad law" for Caperton and the Supreme Court. The decision
would have left Caperton before a biased judge and degraded the court system
by casting doubt on its impartiality. There is a cost to justice and the appearance of justice of using such an often-repeated phrase - frequently divorced
from its original nineteenth century or earlier context 96 - to deny litigants the
See Lawrence i. Lessig. What Everyone Knows and Too Few Accept, 123 HARv. L. REv. 104, 112
(2009) ("In my view, it [the Supreme Court] should not have [intervened]. Caperton was a mistake. The Supreme Court was wrong to expand the reach of due process to remedy the bad judgment of this state supreme court justice."). Professor Lessig nonetheless observes that in some
cases the Supreme Court should step in and grant reliet despite risks to the institution of the judiciary such as those he perceives from the Caperton decision, provided that three conditions are
met. Yet the standards underlying his proposed exceptions or "conditions" are themselves vague,
as he notes:
No doubt, sometimes such risks are worth taking. Where the value is important, where the demands of justice are strong, and where there is no other
plausible institution that might address or remedy the problem at issue: in
those cases of course the Court should act consistent with fidelity to meaning,
despite the costs to the judicial institution. But these three conditions do not
obtain in this case.
Id. at 115. When, for example, are the "demands ofjustice" going to be considered "strong" or a
"value" as "important?" Isn't the right to have an appeal heard before an impartial court an important demand of justice or an important value? As for other institutions available to address the
problem, in the case of Caperton, no other institutions were there: either the Supreme Court
stepped in to help Caperton or no one could (or would). Some of Professor Lessig's reasoning
criticizing the Caperton holding contradicts his very strong statements on damage done by the
facts in Caperton - damage to the system of justice as a whole, not just to the litigant, including
by fostering cynicism concerning the judiciary. As he states:
In the context of Congress. cynicism breeds disengagement
why waste
your time trying to persuade an institution controlled by money (unless. of
course, you too have money)? Critics of Justice Benjamin could rightly fear
that if the same attitude about the state judiciary became dominant, a critical
asset of the judiciary would be lost - if it has not already been lost.
Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted).
96
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of ConstitutionalDoctrine, 30 CONN.
L. REv. 961, 965-46 (1998):
The origins of the phrase are unknown, but it can be traced back as far as the
pleas of two English judges of the 1840s, Baron Rolfe and Lord Campbell,
that hard cases not be allowed to make bad law (the phrase appears to have
been in common usage even then). It was brought into the lore of the Supreme
Court by the first Justice Harlan. and was stated most famously by Justice
Holmes in the passage from the Northern Securities case ....
To understand why hard cases are said to make bad law, one must first appreciate what it is that makes a particular case "hard." As used in this Article, the
term "hard cases" refers to cases where the law, meaning primarily the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court, appears to point strongly towards a
particular result, and yet, because the result seems unduly harsh either to an
individual or to society at large, it is unpalatable to the reviewing court. In the

constitutional, individual-rights context, this most often occurs when a challenged governmental action seems to quite clearly infringe upon a well-
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relief they deserve. Moreover, where the issue is entitlement to an impartial
judge, denying recusal relief is a deprivation of a fundamental principle of the
rule of law.
But the Roberts dissent has attracted the support of other commentary
which likewise fears that the cost of granting Caperton the impartial judge he
deserved - a supposed "flood" of Caperton motions - was too great, even
though Benjamin should have recused himself.9 One problem with this reasonestablished constitutional right, and yet the reasons given by the government
for its actions are (or at least seem to the reviewing court to be) particularly
strong or "compelling."
(footnotes omitted).
See also id. at 968:
The traditional aphorism makes a good deal more sense, however, if understood to refer to hard cases . . .
cases which are "morally" hard, even if they
apparently do not require difficult legal analysis. Under this understanding,
the phrase "hard cases make bad law" is a plea to judges and other rulemakers
not to deviate from, or to alter, clear and well-established rules because of the
equities of a particular case. "Bad law" in this context is understood as the distortion or even the disregard of clear rules for the sake of a "just" result (or
perhaps more accurately, a result that is acceptable to the deciding judge).
See also Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's phrase in his dissent in N. Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.):
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great. not
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because
of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind
of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful,
and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
97
According to Professor Lessig, what Benjamin did was "bad judgment" and Benjamin
should have recused himself:
Thus again, whether Justice Benjamin should have recused himself is in my
view a straightforward question: he should have. By not stepping down, he
strengthened the suggestion that money buys results not just in the political
branches, but also in the judicial branch. He had a duty not to impose this cost
upon the West Virginia courts.
Lessig, supra note 95. at 112. But as noted above. Lessig goes on to conclude that the Supreme
Court should not have recused him.
At some point, such legalistic arguments part company with common sense which is entitled to a
reasonable amount of respect if courts are to receive legitimacy among our citizens. See also
Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal
and Due Process, 28 Miss. C. L. REv. 359, 379 (2009), contending that the Supreme Court should
not have recused Benjamin, but nonetheless noting the extremity of the circumstances:
Justice Benjamin created a firestorm of constitutional proportions when he refused to recuse himself from the case. Whether Justice Benjamin was or could
be impartial is irrelevant. The perceived unfairness is evident. The confluence
of the campaign contribution, its enormity in amount and relative proportion
to the total spent during the election campaign, the connection in time of the
contribution to Massey's appeal and the refusal to recuse amounted to, what
Justice Souter termed, the "ethos of total unreasonability."
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ing is that there is no evidence that an unreasonable expansion of recusal litigation would take place, especially given the majority's circumscribed holding.
What comes next is unknown, 98 and pessimism about the potential outcome
an onslaught of motions - is not evidence.
It is difficult to imagine how and why such a principle should take precedence over the right to an impartial judge. Alternatively, why does such a
principle mean that Caperton must have a "decision for the sake of a decision,"
which is the "negation of the rule of law," as noted in an introductory quote to
this Article, rather than a decision by an impartial judge? 99 What is so special
about the hard case/bad law phrase?
The dissent is also reminiscent of the complaint that rule-makers are
sometimes detached from the havoc that their rules cause "on the ground."
This may be true in various contexts, including wartime, according to a complaint by famed World War II veteran E.B. Sledge:
"Possibly I lost faith that politicians in high places who do not
have to endure war's savagery will ever stop blundering and
sending others to endure it."' 00
If the direction that the rules point is to leave litigants unable to have
their cases heard before an impartial judge, the rules are wrong.101 The same
would be the case if the rules required the punishment of the innocent, which
was the subject of a recent observation by a law professor following up on
comments by Justices Scalia and Thomas in a dissent. 102 At least this time,

While many with legal training are used to hearing, making. or being trained to make such hard
case/bad law arguments, their repetition does not disguise the jarring effect they have on one's
sense of justice and fairness.
98
See Dahlia Lithwick, Caperton Symposium, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 215. 219 (2010)
("Because the truth is that we do not know whether a more rigorous inquiry into judicial bias will
be better or worse for democracy, and we do not yet know what form that inquiry should take. We
do not yet know what the impact of Caperton on the ground will be. We cannot know if it will
create modest improvements in state recusal rules, or lead to a spate of vicious judge-shopping.").
99
Rodley. supra note 1. at 512.
100 Alessandra Stanley, Battlegrounds on "Tiny Specks of Earth," N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at
CL, C16. Sledge's combat experience during World War 1Iis one of those featured in the HBO
mini-series The Pacific. See http://www.hbo.com/the-pacifc/index.html. For Sledge's memoir
of his experience, see E.B. Sledge. WITH THE OLD BREED: AT PELELIU AND OKINAWA (1981).
101
See Stempel, supra note 87, at 66 ("Although states' rights are an important component of
the American system, deference to state courts cannot be so great that it permits decision-making
by judges who reasonably appear to lack neutrality.").
102 A good example of such legal argument occurred in a recent observation by Harvard Law
Professor Alan Dershowitz concerning a dissent by Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas about the constitutional significance of proof of innocence in capital cases
i.e., the constitutionality of executing an innocent person. As Professor Dershowitz wrote:
I never thought I would live to see the day when a justice of the Supreme
Court would publish the following words:
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however, for one litigant (Caperton), the Supreme Court came to the rescue.
But what about the others yet to come?
C.

Post-CapertonRecusal Movement

Limited Progress

Caperton has at least two facets, one progressive, the other not. First,
the case recognizes that judicial elections are different, and campaign contributions may under certain circumstances lead to recusal. Second, it acknowledges
that the Due Process Clause will not rescue the litigants despite campaign contributions except in extreme cases, and therefore state recusal standards will
govern in most situations. In most states, however, recusal is a difficult process:
the target judge typically decides the recusal motion; and for reasons of reputation, a judge may declare herself impartial even when she knows that is incor10 3
rect or may not recognize bias since some biases are unconscious in nature.
Also, the appellate courts typically affirm denials of recusal,
and the burden of
04
proof to be met by the party seeking recusal is substantial.1
"This court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to
convince a habeas court that he is 'actually' innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that question unresolved, while expressing
considerable doubt that any claim based on alleged 'actual innocence' is
constitutionally cognizable."
Yet these words appeared in a dissenting opinion issued by Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas on Monday. Let us be clear precisely what this
means. If a defendant were convicted, after a constitutionally unflawed trial.
of murdering his wife, and then came to the Supreme Court with his very
much alive wife at his side, and sought a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence (namely that his wife was alive), these two justices would tell him,
in effect: "Look, your wife may be alive as a matter of fact, but as a matter of
constitutional law, she's dead, and as for you, Mr. Innocent Defendant, you're
dead, too, since there is no constitutional right not to be executed merely because you're innocent."
Alan M. Dershowitz, Scalia's Catholic Betrayal. THE DAILY BEAST. Aug. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-08-18/scalias-catholic-betrayal.
Justice
Scalia was dissenting from the Court's decision to transfer a petition for habeas corpus to the

District Court for further consideration in In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009).
o0 Molly McLucas, The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judiciary, 42
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 671, 683 (2009).
104

See JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR

COURTS:

SETTING

RECUSAL

STANDARDS

18

(2008),

available

at

http://brennancenter.org/content/resource/fair courts setting-recusal standards/:
In all for-cause disqualification motions, the evidentiary and persuasive burdens rest with the movant: judicial bias. partiality, and interest are never presumed. These burdens are heavy. To prevail, the movant "ordinarily must adduce facts that would raise significant doubt as to whether justice would be
done in the case." On appeal, odds of success are even worse. Nearly every

appellate court, state and federal, will overturn a lower court's disqualification
or recusal decision only for an "abuse of discretion."
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The response by the states in the comparatively brief time since Caperton was decided has been mixed and indecisive in terms of recusal reform, with
few exceptions. Although the legislative or judicial climate could change, there
has been some resistance to recusal reform, including to legislation providing
clear monetary limits as a grounds for recusal and to having recusal motions
heard by judges other than the judge sought to be recused.10 5 Michigan is an
exception, allowing de novo review by other judges when a judge denies a recusal motion. 106 To date, however, the rules are essentially the same as before,
and the problem of dealing with money in judicial politics through recusal remains.' 0°
A number of knowledgeable commentators have already weighed in on
the subject of how to improve recusal standards and procedures.10 8
In brief,
however, some reform proposals include reducing deference to the target
judge; 10 9 allowing de novo review by other judges than the target judge, if the
target judge denies the recusal motion; setting specific cut-off limits for contributions, which, when exceeded, automatically require recusal (leaving an intense dispute over how high or low the limit should be); peremptory disqualifi-

(footnotes omitted).
105
Nathan Koppel. States Weigh JudicialRecusals, Some Judges, Businesses Oppose Restrictions on Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, Jan. 26. 2010. WALL ST. J.. available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703822404575019370305029334.html.
See id.
("More states are responding to a longstanding concern that elected judges risk the appearance of
bias when they hear cases involving their campaign contributors. But recent examples from Wisconsin and Nevada show that some states are reluctant to force judges to disqualify themselves
from cases solely because they have received large contributions."). According to the article,
Wisconsin Justice David Prosser sought to disconnect recusal from campaign contributions, noting that "itwould be improper to 'deprive citizens who lawfully contribute to judicial campaigns ... of access to the judges they help elect."' Id.
106
Disqualification of Judge, MI Rules MCR 2.003 (2009); see also Order Amending Rule
2.003 of the Michigan Court Rules, ADM File No. 2009-04 (Nov. 25, 2009), available at
http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Resources/Administrative/2009-04-112509.pdf;
see
generally James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAi L. REV. 787
(2010) (among other things, discussing accepted recusal reforms in Michigan and rejected reforms
in Wisconsin).
107
Others have already canvassed the limited recusal reform efforts after Caperton. See Sample, supra note 106. at 793-8 10 (mainly focusing on reform efforts in Michigan and Wisconsin).
108
See SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 104.
109
See Gregory W. Jones. Free Speech and Tainted Justice: Restoring the Public's Confidence
in the Judiciary in the Wake of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
441, 465 (2010) ("[T]he current manner of administering recusal and disqualification flies in the
face of the accepted adage that 'no man is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause.' Credibility in
the judiciary cannot be realized if judges are permitted to evaluate their own impartiality. The
administrative procedures associated with recusal and disqualification must be overhauled to
require that a judge other than the one being challenged evaluate and determine all motions regarding judicial impartiality or bias." ) (footnote omitted).
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cation of judges;110 and the like. Still others suggest procedural details, like
requiring a recusal motion to be in writing and promptly made.1"
Some of the proposals for recusal reform have problems, including in
the case of specific cut-off limits, handling contributions made to disfavored
judges so as to result in a strategic disqualification of those judges. In other
words, one might adopt a strategy of getting rid of a judge one does not like
simply by contributing over the amount of the specified limit to her campaign.
In addition, if the cut-off limit is too high, some may be concerned that unsavory situations will remain uncorrected. If the limit is too low, others may be
concerned that recusals will be frequent - even when contributions are so small
that one might reasonably believe bias is remote.
With deference to judges other than the target, there are also concerns
about strategic recusals, where one judge or group of judges is inclined to disqualify another principally because of a voting disagreement, as opposed to a
recusal standard necessarily being met. But without a transfer or review
process, where judges other than the target review the motion, it is difficult to
avoid an observation - and this is not meant to be original - that the recusal
process is like a judge grading her own paper. 1 2 Indeed, the concept invites
many clever observations, and one of the better ones follows:
The uproar over conflicts of interest at the West Virginia Supreme Court calls into question the practice of giving judges the
final say in their recusals - even when they're faced with demands to step down ...."There's a lot not to like in leaving it
up to the conscience of the individual judge," said Deborah

110 Penny White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REv. 120, 149 (2009) ("As a

complementary component of recusal reform, states should enact statutes allowing for peremptory
judicial challenges. Judicial peremptory challenge statutes, already in existence in several states,
allow parties to substitute one judge without stating a reason. By allowing each side to recuse a

judge as a matter of course, litigants would be insulated against an overly strict application of
Caperton's constitutional disqualification rule.") (footnotes omitted).
III Id. at 147-48. In addition to monetary recusals, judges need to recuse themselves when
they have indicated in their campaigns "willingness to rule a specific way on a particular issue or
to reach a certain result in a case." Id. at 149.
112
See also Roy A. Schotland. Caperton Capers: Comment on Four of the Articles, 60
SYRACUSE L. REv. 337, 342 (2010) ("[W] can do better than having ajudge deliberate with herself
about whether to recuse .... [A]t many appellate courts and almost all high courts, recusal cries
for procedures to assure fairness and protect public confidence - and to work effectively and
smoothly, no small challenge in multi-member courts. In a very few high courts (Alabama and
Texas formally and by practice in a few others). motions seeking recusal are reviewed by the full
court. But many multi-member courts (especially high courts) simply leave recusal decisions
entirely to the judge targeted by a motion.").
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Rhode, director
of the Center for Ethics at Stanford University's
1 3
school.'
law
So it was in West Virginia where it was up to Justice Benjamin to decide his
own recusal motion. 14
Indeed, making someone a judge in her own case is ill-advised, even in
everyday matters. One might not wish to defer to another person (judge or nonjudge) on the question of whether such person is intelligent, good-looking,
speaks or sings well, deserves a promotion or a raise, or is a good cook. Similarly, one might also hesitate to defer to a judge who is supposed to adjudicate
her own neutrality.
After awhile, with all the frustration, one might be inclined to rest
except in the more extreme cases like Caperton in which a judge is really
caught - on the unempirical or arguably ostrich-like statement that adjudicators
are presumed to be impartial;' 5 on the "myth" of the "judicial sanctity;"' 1 6 or on
the fatalistic observation that "that's just the way things are." With all the problems in achieving recusals for campaign contributions, exasperation would be
understandable.
D.

Some Reflections on Bias and the Judiciary,JudicialElections, and the
Rule ofLaw

The apparently biased judge may do great damage in terms of destroying public confidence in the courts. If the courts appear biased, the consequences may be unwelcome (to put it delicately): e.g., leading to disrespect for

H, The Associated Press, Massey-Maynard Photos Highlight Judicial Recusal Rule, THE
HERALD-DISPATCH,

Jan. 27, 2008 (cited by SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 104, at 31).

114 See W. Va. R. App. P. 29(b) ("A justice shall disqualify himself or herself, upon proper
motion or sua sponte, in accordance with the provisions of Canon 3(E)(1) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct or, when sua sponte. for any other reason the justice deems appropriate."); See also Steven Lubet, It Takes a Court, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 221, 223 (2010) ("Under the rules of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, disqualification motions are addressed only 'to the justice
whose disqualification is sought,' and they are never considered by the full court. Thus, the challenged justice has the sole, and unreviewable, authority to decide whether his or her own impartiality 'might reasonably be questioned.'") (footnotes omitted).
115 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975)); see also John A. Meiser, The (Non)
Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judicial Disqualification,84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1799, 1834 (2009) ("[T]he Caperton saga is ugly and troubling .... ).
116 See Jeff Shesol, Justices Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at WK10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/opinion/14shesol.html [hereinafter Justices Will Prevail]
("The judicial robe confers a kind of exaltation on nearly everyone who wears it. Judicial sanctity
may be a myth, but it is a powerful one; it reinforces our hope that this is really a government of
laws, not merely of fallible human beings."). Jeff Shesol is the author of SUPREME POWER:
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010) [hereinafter SUPREME POWER] on the plan

to "pack" the Supreme Court.
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the courts, avoidance of the courts, unpredictability of the courts, uncertainty of
transactions, and, for lack of a better phrasing, the unfortunate sense that under
color of law money is going to A which should be going to B. In addition,
businesses may decline to invest in a state where this is not addressed, leading to
a loss of jobs and tax revenue. 17 The judge may also do great damage in an
individual case.
Although some litigants may assume that they are protected by the presumption that judges are impartial, the presumption is of no value if inconsistent
with reality.11 8 Indeed, there is little "safety" in relying on such a presumption
- much like a driver's presumption when driving that a deer will not jump out
of the trees, dash into the highway and collide with the driver's car -just because there is no "deer-crossing sign." The chances of a biased decision occurring may be small, but when it occurs, the damage is unacceptable. 19
Eliminating judicial elections will not avoid all threats of bias. But
doing so may be a good start toward achieving impartiality and other ideals.
While not implying that judicial elections are unconstitutional per se, Supreme
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a 2008 concurring opinion, commented that
they may be inconsistent with the rule of law because of their effect on the "perception and reality of judicial independence and excellence:"
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for
competition among interest groups and political parties, the per117 Perspectives From the Rule of Law, supra note 18, at 103 (discussing potential economic
consequences ofjudicial elections). The relationship between poor economic outcomes in a country and the lack of the rule of law (not merely judicial bias or lack of judicial independence) has
been repeatedly made. Although the strength and extent of the relationship have sometimes been
questioned. billions of dollars have been spent in reliance on the connection over decades. Id. at
55-56, 103, 113.
118 As Chief Justice Roberts phrased the presumption:
There is a "presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adj udicators." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975). All judges take an oath to
uphold the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that they
will live up to this promise. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S.
765, 796 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("We should not, even by inadvertence, 'impute to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor.' (quoting
Bridges v. California,314 U. S. 252, 273 (1941))).
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
119 See also Brief for the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae In Support of Neither
Party, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 2009 WL 45973, at *22:
While there is a presumption of integrity in the judiciary, the very fact that it
is merely a presumption indicates that in some situations it can and will be
overcome. Thus, in evaluating whether a judge's potential bias violates a litigant's due process rights, the question is not whether a judge of the highest integrity may be able to resist the temptation of partiality. Rather, the question is
whether an average judge would be tempted under the circumstances.
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sisting question is whether that process is consistent with the
perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial
excellence. The rule of law, which is a foundation of freedom,
presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional attainments, and the absolute probity of
its judges. And it may seem difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections. 120
Whether something could be inconsistent with modern standards of the
rule of law and nevertheless be constitutional is beyond the scope of this Article.
(It also has even been observed that judicial elections may themselves be unconstitutional,1 21 yet states may tolerate them because of an "uncritical fondness
for elections." 1 22 ). Nevertheless, one would hope that our constitution would be
interpreted so as to equal or exceed the rule of law.
Elections do provide the ability - however limited - to choose candidates, even though some judicial elections may present an odd and meaningless
choice. Because one does not know and cannot readily find out about what one
needs to know about the candidates in order to make an intelligent choice, 23 the
choice is illusory. "Elections are crude forums, at best, for airing and making

120

See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791. 803 (2008) (Kennedy. J.,

concurring) (upholding the constitutionality of New York's election of certain state court trial
judges). See generally Perspectives From the Rule of Law. supra note 18 (inconsistency of judicial elections with the rule of law). Justice Kennedy's observations on fund-raising in the quote
from Lopez Torres recognize the problem of money in judicial elections. At least the spirit of his
remarks seem to conflict with his opinion for the majority in Citizens United which will have the
effect of injecting even more campaign contributions into judicial elections by removing limits on
certain corporate, union and other contributions.
121 White, supra note 110, at 127 ("If we are serious about providing a fair trial before a fair
tribunal, then we should recognize forthrightly that the Due Process Clause perhaps should have a
nullifying, or at least a limiting, effect on judicial elections.").
122

Id. at 127:

[W]e persistently avoid a discussion about the constitutionality of judicial
elections and view such a discussion as counterproductive because surveys
suggest that most Americans want to elect their judges. But it is equally true
that most Americans (arguably all Americans) want fair, independent, and
impartial courts. What has led us to this juncture at which we consistently endorse the importance of elections over other, core constitutional rights? The
current tendency to liken judicial elections to other elections is neither historically accurate nor constitutionally sound. It is a tendency animated by an uncritical fondness for elections and an unthinking linkage to the First Amendment, at the expense of the surpassingly important right to a fair trial before a
fair tribunal.
123
Perspectives From the Rule of Law, supra note 18, at 91 n.149; Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to Develop a Model Appointive Selection Plan
for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REv. 597. 601 02 (2005) ("Voters in New York. as
elsewhere, generally do not even know who the candidates for judge are, and they often do not
vote for judicial candidates at all.").

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

37

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

decisions about judicial performance. 124 Faced with such a choice, according
to a protagonist in one of J.M. Coetzee's novels, the unfortunate voter has several options, "not voting, or else spoiling his ballot paper" (if paper ballots are
used) in which case, the vote is "not counted, that is to say, is discounted, ignored." 125 The voter could also vote "blind" without knowing anything about
either candidate. Furthermore, in many cases, judicial offices - although nominally elective - are unopposed or politically controlled; 26 and then there is
no choice at all.
E.

An Observation on Caperton's Futility
The West Virginia Court, once again, overturned the $50 million judgment against Massey Coal, by a lopsided 4 to 1 vote.

124 Schotland, Special Interest Influence, supra note 27, at 514; see also id:
Roe v. Wade. flag salutes, lightning-rod capital cases, cases about a child, and
cases about other dramatically personal plights (e.g.. Terri Schiavo) are infinitely far from the docket of virtually any judge who faces some election
but many judicial campaigns have involved, often centered on, such matters ....
The hot-button issues or cases likely to get attention in campaigns are
a complete (or near-complete) distortion of what the judge or candidate has
done or can do. Would anyone say that the public discourse about hot-button
cases is any better than distorting. hyper-simplification. and slanting? Such
episodes are outbursts of passion seeking to displace our processes and dispassionate, deliberative efforts to act justly
the opposite of all we revere as
the rule of law.
125 J.M. COETZEE, DIARY OF A BAD YEAR 8 (2007). Coetzee elaborates on illusory electoral
choices in democracies as follows:
The ballot paper does not say: Do you want A or B or neither? It certainly
never says: Do you want A or B or no one at all? The citizen who expresses
his unhappiness with the form of choice on offer by the only means open to
him
not voting, or else spoiling his ballot paper
is simply not counted,
that is to say. is discounted, ignored.
Faced with a choice between A and B, given the kind of A and the kind of B
who usually make it onto the ballot paper, most people, ordinary people, are
in their hearts inclined to choose neither. But that is only an inclination, and
the state does not deal in inclinations ....
What the state deals in are choices.
The ordinary person would like to say: Some days I incline to A, some days to
B, most days Ijust feel they should both go away; or else, Some ofA and some
of B, sometimes, and at other times neither A nor B but something quite different. The state shakes its head. You have to choose, says the state: A or B.
Id.
126 See Norman L. Greene, What Makes a Good Appointive System for the Selection of State
Court Judges: The Vision of the Symposium. 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35, 41-47 (2007) (discussing
Second Circuit's decision in N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres. 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.
2006). rev'd 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008) and describing political-boss-controlled elections).
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So, after all of the litigation, the case ends up exactly127where it
was before the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the case.

[T]he disqualificationissue herein gives the appearance of being a diversion
awayfrom the solid basisfor the majority's opi28
nion herein.1

To be fair, the recusal effort was not quite a "diversion," despite Justice
Benjamin's comment above. Seeking fair and impartial justice is never a diversion but essential. Caperton underwent a long and probably costly appeal that
succeeded in the United States Supreme Court. 129 The apparently biased judge
was disqualified. But in the end it was futile for Caperton. Rather than change
the decision, a new set of judges (without the recused judge) reached the same
result on the merits as the previous set of judges, with an even greater majority.
(4-1 instead of 3-2).13 As the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted
on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court following recusal:
Based upon our thorough consideration of the parties' arguments, the relevant case law, and the record on appeal, this
Court concludes, based upon the existence of a forum-selection
clause contained in a contract that directly related to the conflict
giving rise to the instant lawsuit, that the circuit court erred in
denying a motion to dismiss filed by A.T. Massey Coal Company and its subsidiaries. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
in this case and remand for the circuit court to enter an order
127 Rotunda, supra note 73, at 278 (footnote omitted); see also id. ("Caperton also does not say
that the decision on the merits must come out differently. The Supreme Court merely remanded
the case to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The state court once again reversed the
judgment.").
128 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223, 301 (2008) (Benjamin,
Acting C.J., concurring) (refusing to recuse himself from the hearing of the case).

129 Although research has not disclosed the cost of the appeal, the cost of the overall case has
evidently been substantial for Caperton. See Gibeaut. supra note 68. "At 53, Caperton says the
case has taken its toll not only on his bank account, but also on his health. 'It's
miserable,' he
says. 'It's
like living in purgatory. IWs cost me everything I've got. I've spent every nickel I've
ever had trying to right this wrong.'" Id.
130
Posting of Marcia Coyle, Caperton Coda, to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times,
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/11 /Caperton-coda.html (Nov. 13, 2009 13:29 EST) (West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again overturns the verdict in favor of Caperton by a 4-1
decision, rather than 3-2 as was previously the case); John M. O'Brien, Massey Victorious as
Controversial
$50M
Case
Comes
to
End
in
W.
Va.
THE W. VA. RECORD, Nov. 12, 2009. http://www.wvrecord.com/news/222238-massey-victoriousas-controversial-50m-case-comes-to-end-in-w.va. The decision on remand, filed on November
12. 2009, appears at 690 S.E.2d 322.
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dismissing, with prejudice, this case against A.T. Massey Coal
Company and its subsidiaries. 3
After all that, it just ended for Caperton, U.S. Supreme Court victory
notwithstanding.
How may that futility be avoided? One solution would be to ensure that
litigants receive a prompt (and fair) decision on recusal without it costing a fortune. Standards for recusal may be relaxed or made more certain so that a party
considering recusal will have a better way to assess the likelihood of success.
Litigants might (but should not) have to weigh whether their underlying case is
strong or weak on the merits before undergoing a recusal process. A litigant in
every case, regardless of its strength, is entitled to an unbiased judge; and it
should not be overly complicated to obtain one.
II. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, AND CITIZEANS UANITED
Then I chargedyourjudges at that time, saying, 'Hearthe cases
between yourfellow countrymen, andjudge righteously between
a man and his fellow countryman, or the alien who is with
him. ,132
131 Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 328. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia alluded to

the tangled history of finding the correct unbiased judges to hear the case, as follows:
The first opinion filed in connection with this appeal was vacated based upon
the subsequent voluntary disqualification of two of the justices who participated in the earlier proceedings in this Court. A second opinion entered on rehearing was reversed by the United States Supreme Court based upon that
Court's determination that an additional justice should have been disqualified.
See Capertonv. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,
US
, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173
L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009). A detailed recitation of the complex procedural history
of this case is set out in the body of this opinion at Section i. page 10 infra.
Id. at 328, n. 1.
132 Deuteronomy 1:16. Chief Justice Randall Shepard of the Indiana Supreme Court wrote an
account of ancient views of judicial impartiality which bears citation in full:
Long before there were judicial elections, or even a First Amendment, societies took steps to assure the impartiality of the judges who held sway over
them. Moses gave strict instructions to his judges in words frequently cited
over the intervening centuries: "Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not
respect persons, neither take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise,
and pervert the words of the righteous." Cicero later built on this idea by
identifying three causes of judicial impropriety: favoritism, coercion, and bribery. A stern attitude about judicial misbehavior led to formal efforts at curbing abuses and, if the ancient writings may be believed, the penalty of death
was not unknown in medieval times. In one European kingdom during the Seventh Century, the penalties for judicial partiality evolved to a form more readily recognized by modern minds: a judge who refused to hear a plaintiffs
claim or grant relief due to favoritism or friendship was liable to the plaintiff

for that which the plaintiff would have received from his adversary. By the
Eighth Century, the idea arose that a misbehaving judge might owe a penalty
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You shall not show partiality in judgment,- you shall hear the
small and the great alike. You shall notfear man, for the judgment is God's. The case that is too hardfor you, you shall bring
to me, and I will hear it. 133
A.

The Holding in Citizens United

Citizens United invalidated federal campaign finance restrictions on independent expenditures made by corporations from their general treasury funds
(that is, their "own funds") which advocate the election or defeat of a candidate
in certain federal elections. 134 The Court stressed the First Amendment free
speech rights of corporations and noted that they applied to political speech like
such expenditures; that the campaign finance restrictions abridged those First
Amendment rights; and First Amendment distinctions may not be drawn on the
basis of the status of the speaker, whether an individual or a corporation.
The Supreme Court rejected the claim that corporations do not warrant
the same First Amendment protections as natural persons. As the Supreme
Court noted: "Political speech is 'indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual.' ' '135 The scope of the decision extends beyond corporate
spending to spending by others, including unions. "[P]olitical speech of corporations or other associations should [not] be treated differently under the
First
' 136
Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons.'
The equating of corporate and individual free speech rights drew a sharp
dissent from Justice Stevens. As his dissent in Citizens United noted in protest,

to the litigant and a penalty to the crown as well. Many medieval legal systems provided both judicial liability and appellate review through collateral at-

tack by the aggrieved litigant. This system of actions in the nature of "false
judgments" took root in the English common law and ultimately evolved into
arrangements whose purposes were largely appellate review.
Shepard, supra note 16, at 1060-61(footnotes omitted).
133 Deuteronomy 1:17.
134 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010): see id. at

897

("The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions. [Two U.S.C. §] 441b makes
it a felony for all corporations
including nonprofit advocacy corporations
either to expressly
advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election."); see also id. at 880-81 (Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an "electioneering communication" or for speech

expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441b.").
135 Id. at 904 (citation omitted).
136 Id. at 900.
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corporations differ from individuals and should not enjoy the same First
Amendment protections:
It might also be added that corporations have no consciences,
no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations
help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be
sure, and their "personhood" often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of "We the People"
by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.137
To take this one step further, corporations do not marry (a merger is not
the same thing), have children or grandchildren, get sick or die, or ever go to
war.

138

Restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations in election
campaigns have been upheld for a long time on theories, among other things,
that they are necessary to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption in
government. 139 The Supreme Court in Citizens United held that those justifications are no longer pertinent since such contributions do not give rise to either:
The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the
speech here in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expenditures by for profit corporations. The Govern137

Id. at 972 (Stevens. J. dissenting).

138

See also Dahlia Litwick, The Pinocchio Project: Watching as the Supreme Court Turns a

Corporation into a Real Live Boy. SLATE, Jan. 21, 2010. http://www.slate.com/id/2242208/.
Although the Supreme Court focused on corporations, as previously noted. Citizens United applies
to other organizations, including to unions. See generally Steven J. Law. Organized Labor and
Citizens United, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 11. 2010. at A.15.
139 Other theories asserted in favor of the existing reforms restricting corporate independent
expenditures included protecting shareholder rights and preventing corporations from receiving an
unfair political advantage (namely. the anti-distortion rationale). See with respect to shareholder
rights. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 977 (2010) (citing Austin) and
id. at 911 ("The Government contends further that corporate independent expenditures can be
limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund
corporate political speech."). With respect to the distortive effect of contributions, see Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990), noting:
Michigan's regulation. . . aims at a different type of corruption in the political
arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas...
The Act does not attempt "to equalize the relative influence of speakers on
elections,"... rather, it ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.... Corporate wealth can
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent
expenditures. just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions. We therefore hold that the State has articulated a sufficiently compelling
rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures by corporations.
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ment does not claim that these expenditures have corrupted the
political process in those States ....
[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations,
14
0
do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.
But the Court upheld existing disclosure and disclaimer laws in connection with contributions, finding that the laws served an important purpose and
did not unconstitutionally infringe on speech. Those laws required information
on the source of the campaign advertisements and the identities of contributors.
Among other things, the Court found no showing that "these requirements would impose a chill on speech or expression.

140

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 09; see also id. at 910 ("The appearance of influence or

access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an
independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with
a candidate."). For a recent case following Citizens United, see SpeechNow.Org. et al v. Federal
Election Commission,
F.3d
, No. 08-5223 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), slip. op., at 10, 14
(noting that Citizens United "held that the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting
independent expenditures;" concluding that "the government has no anti-corruption interest in
limiting contributions to an independent expenditure group such as SpeechNow:" and invalidating
contributions limits as applied to SpeechNow.) As the D.C. Circuit noted:
In light of the Court's holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, con-

tributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption. The Court has effectively held
that there is no corrupting "quid" for which a candidate might in exchange offer a corrupt "quo."
Id. at 14.
141 The Supreme Court identified the disclaimer and disclosures rules as follows:
Citizens United next challenges BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure provisions
as applied to Hillary and the three advertisements for the movie. Under BCRA
§ 311. televised electioneering communications funded by anyone other than a
candidate must include a disclaimer that "'
[the individual] is responsible for the content of this advertising.'" 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2). The required
statement must be made in a "clearly spoken manner," and displayed on the
screen in a "clearly readable manner" for at least four seconds. Ibid. It must
state that the communication "is not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee"; it must also display the name and address (or Web site address) of the person or group that funded the advertisement. § 441d(a)(3). Under BCRA § 201, any person who spends more than $10.000 on electioneering
communications within a calendar year must file a disclosure statement with
the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1). That statement must identify the person making the expenditure, the amount of the expenditure, the election to which the
communication was directed, and the names of certain contributors. §
434(f)(2).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913-14.
142

Id. at 916.
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Citizens United as Applied to JudicialElections

In the name of First Amendment imperatives, Citizens United permits
the injection of vast additional amounts of money into American elections, including, by inference, U.S. state court judicial elections. Many state judicial
elections are already bedeviled by excess campaign spending and ensuing irrelevant, misleading and negative advertisements. 4 3 This does not mean that
more money will be spent and advertisements placed, only that they can be.
(The basis for the Supreme Court exempting judicial elections from Citizens
United on the basis of its threat to an impartial judiciary is unclear, particularly
given the current makeup of the Court.)
Citizens United thus exacerbates the threat to judicial impartiality already recognized by Caperton through judicial elections. In United States state
court judicial elections, where judges need to collect and receive campaign contributions (directly or indirectly) 144 and seek favor from voters, the risks to judicial impartiality have already been perceived as severe. The integrity of judges
has been described as falling under a "dark shadow."' 145 "Today, judicial elections weaken state courts and reduce their willingness to defend the rule of law
against public opposition or special interests. 14 6 By the very nature of the situation, judges may appear to be biased in favor of local voters and significant
campaign contributors. 147 "Just as judicial candidates may face a temptation to
shade their decisions to attract voters' support, so too they may face the tempta143

See, e.g.. Perspectives From the Rule of Law. supra note 18. at 100, 109 (Michigan and

West Virginia examples). This is not to say that all campaign advertisements are irrelevant, misleading, and negative.
144
Sometimes judicial campaign expenditures are made to and received by campaign committees rather than by or to the judge directly. See Rotunda. supra note 73, at 257 ("States recognize
that, when judges assume office by popular election, the judges will have to raise campaign contributions. In an effort to avoid the taint of corruption, states typically impose restrictions on campaign fundraising. The typical judicial ethics rule prohibits the judicial candidate from personally
soliciting campaign funds. Instead, the candidate must establish a campaign committee. That
committee (but not the judge personally) may solicit funds.") (footnotes omitted).
145
Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault Upon Impartiality of State
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265, 281-82 (2007) ("A
dark shadow is falling, fairly or unfairly, upon the perceived integrity ofjudges in many states that
elect judges. Justice has been characterized as being "for sale." Impartiality and the judiciary's
rule-of-law function are plainly threatened ....
[C]urrent thinking on how to protect the impartiality of the judiciary is gravitating toward the use and refinement of appointive methods of selection and related processes.").
146
Shugerman, supra note 14, at 1064.
147
But see David Haynes, What Should Shirley Do?, MILWAUKEE, WIs. J. SENTINEL, Feb. 25,

Courts and the Challenge to JudicialSelection, 34

2009,

available

at

http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/acrosstheboard.html?tag

=

Shirley+Abrahamson (quoting Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson: "'The antidote to anyone buying you, or buying a campaign or buying a judicial vote, is to
get small contributions from diverse groups, so you are beholden to everyone in the state and you
are not beholden to any single group' Abrahamson said after a Dane County Bar Association
debate recently.").
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tion to shade their decisions to attract the financial support that enables them to
appeal to voters., 148 These temptations are important in light of the duty of
judges to be impartial, something which separates judges from other elected
officials. 149 Although some have put forward public financing of judicial elections as a solution, others have observed that it has been "oversold" and may not
be financially feasible. 50 Following a report of its Independent Commission on
Judicial Reform, West Virginia
has recently adopted a pilot public financing
5
1
races.1
judicial
certain
for
plan
Although observations and surveys about the problems with judicial
elections may not be conclusive proof, 152 they do demonstrate a level of concern
that policymakers may consider as a basis for action. Legislatures proposing
reforms in judicial selection and citizens voting on such reforms are free to act
on lesser standards than empirical proof. Policymakers proposing rules on re-

148 Karlan, supra note 14, at 90; Perspectives on JudicialSelection, supra note 14, at 957.
149 Erwin Chemerinsky. Preservingan Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and
Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CH.-KENT L. REv. 133, 149 (1998); see also id. at
143:
Indeed, Buckley can be distinguished based on differences between judicial
candidates and those running for Congress or President. Buckley. of course,
involved exclusively the latter: candidates for Congress and for President and
Vice-President. It is accepted that these officials are influenced by many factors, including explicit lobbying. Certainly, buying their votes or decisions
with campaign contributions or expenditures is impermissible, but some influence is accepted as a part of the system.
150 Schotland, Special Interest Influence, supra note 27, at 524-25. Professor Schotland observes that although public funding of judicial elections "unquestionably brings advances," it is
"oversold" since it will not end "independent spending" and might encourage it; it also might
encourage competition and therefore political pressure on judges running for office; and because
of its cost, it is likely to be feasible only in "small-population states." Id.
151 Editorial, From Scandal to Example in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010 03/19/opinion/i 9fri3.htmlscp=1&sq=west%20virginia%0 20
and%20public%20financing&st cse ("West Virginia, which will join North Carolina, New Mexico and Wisconsin in adopting public financing of judicial races, is setting a good example at a
time when judicial neutrality and the appearance of neutrality is under severe threat across the
country from escalating special-interest spending on judicial campaigns."): see Final Report, West
Virginia Independent Commission on Judicial Reform, Nov. 15. 2009: Ry Rivard. JudicialReport
Reforms Gradual Measures Were Praised by Some, Dismissed by Others as a Failure,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Nov. 17, 2009 (quoting author, among others, on the final West Vir-

ginia plan).
152 A collection of sources can sometimes give the impression that the subject is "locked up."
both qualitatively and quantitatively, and that the propositions are firmly established in every
single state with indisputable evidence. An example of such a pile-up of sources appears in Shugerman, supra note 14, at 1064. Obviously, evidence is stronger in some places than in others,
and sometimes one extrapolates from evidence in one state to reach conclusions about another.
Moreover, in order to assess quantitative evidence, one would need to assess the methodology
(including the fairness and comprehensiveness of gathering evidence and the selection of variables). and often no one goes behind executive summaries or assertions in articles.
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cusal and judges deciding recusal motions may and do act on lesser standards as
well.
In addition, empirical proof is not the only meaningful evidence here.
Impartial justice relates to the appearance of impartiality and the existence of
extraneous inducements and incentives to favor one side or another. These are
not always quantifiable or measurable, and there is a role for subjective factors,
including logic and common sense.
If one's judge has made campaign statements about policies implicated
by a lawsuit, has financially benefited from the campaign efforts of one's adversary, or is ruling on a matter of local interest potentially memorable by the voters at election time, it is logical and a matter of common sense for concerns to
arise. In evaluating impartiality, one must ask what are the incentives and inducements affecting the judge. Nonetheless, an empirical study on judicial impartiality may potentially be designed; and to some extent, some studies already
exist, such as those considering the extent to which judges
are deciding (or ap53
parently deciding) in favor of campaign contributors. 1
According to the dissent in Citizens United, substantial expenditures on
"candidate elections" sometimes "will raise an intolerable specter of quid pro
quo corruption" or "dollars exchanged for political favors."1' 54 As amplified by
the Supreme Court in an earlier case:
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office
by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of
money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption
is the
155
financial quidpro quo: dollars for political favors.

153

Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts. Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings. N.Y.

TIMEs, Oct. 1. 2006, at Al.
154
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 967 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissenting). The majority in Citizens United elaborated on quid pro quo corruption as follows:
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was li-

mited to quid pro quo corruption. See McConnell, supra, at 296-298 (opinion
of Kennedy, J.) (citing Buckley, supra, at 26-28, 30, 46-48); ACPAC, 470 U.

S., at 497 ("The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars
for political favors"); id., at 498.
Id. at 909-10.

Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985).
155

For an extensive discussion of the subject of corruption and campaign finance cases, see, e.g.,
Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. LAW 793, 842 (2001) (including section on corruption and campaign contributions; noting, among other things: "As the Supreme

Court noted, 'Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.' The United
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The spending of vast sums
in campaigns is "inextricably associated with
1 56
corruption.
of
appearance
the
If campaign contributions in judicial election campaigns are perceived
as a problem, allowing even more contributions to be made potentially worsens
the situation, and, according to former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, may do so

quite soon; 15 and this may further damage the appearance of impartiality in the
courts. 158 (Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg have declared their opposition to state court judicial elections.) 159 Although Caperton
and cases following the extreme Caperton fact pattern may present litigants with
a remedy of recusal under the federal Due Process Clause, many other cases
involving lesser spending than Caperton equally impinge on impartiality con-

States sought to limit some of the pernicious effects of campaign contributions by requiring disclosure of donors and imposing limitations on the total amount that individuals may contribute
directly to a candidate." Id. at 843 (footnote omitted)) see also Lori Ringhand. Defining Democracy: The Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 77 (2004): Zephyr
Teachout, The Anti-CorruptionPrinciple, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 341 (2009).
See also Clyde Wilcox. Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing
The Tributaries of Campaign Finance, 4 ELECTION L. J. 371. 372 73 (2005):

156

"... Democratic political systems must find a way to finance political campaigns without encouraging the sale of politicians to contributors." Potential
donors seek access to and policy from government officials, and policymakers
seek money from donors to fund their parties and campaigns. This exchange
creates a great temptation for corruption. Of course, in some states, corruption
may still consist of direct gifts of cash, goods, or services to policymakers.
But as these sorts of direct payoffs are controlled, the likelihood that the campaign finance system will become the locus of corruption increases. (citation
omitted).
Paul Carrington. Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State

Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 118 (1998) ("[T]he practice of spending large sums of
money on a political campaign is inextricably associated with the appearance of corruption, and
the reality of defamation and fraud, that degrades the courts").
157
Adam Liptak, Former Justice O'Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIvES.
Jan. 26, 2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/us/politics/27judge.html
[hereinafter Former Justice O'Connor Sees I] ("In invalidating some of the existing checks on
campaign spending," Justice O'Connor said [at a Georgetown Law Center conference held on
January 26, 2010], "the majority in Citizens United has signaled that the problem of campaign
contributions in judicial elections might get considerably worse and quite soon.") In addition to
the NY TIvES' Supreme Court Reporter Adam Liptak. the author of this Article also attended the
Georgetown conference.
158 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The majority of the States select
their judges through popular elections. At a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial
elections have reached a fever pitch, see, e.g., O'Connor. Justice for Sale. WALL ST. J.. Nov. 15.
2007, p. A25; Brief for Justice at Stake et al. as Amici Curiae 2, the Court today unleashes the
floodgates of corporate and union general treasury spending in these races.").
159
Robert Barnes, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Says She Would Forbid State Judicial Elections,
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
12,
2010,
available at
dyn/content/article/2010/03/11 /AR2010031105136.html.
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served in his dissent in Citizens United:

[Vol. 112

As Justice Stevens ob-

[T]he Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general treasury spending in these races. Perhaps "Caperton
motions" will catch some of the worst abuses. This will be
small comfort to those States that, after today, may no longer
have the ability to place modest limits on corporate electioneering even if they believe such limits to6 be critical to maintaining
the integrity of their judicial systems. 0
The logic of the majority's argument that because twenty-six states
were not corrupted by the contributions permitted in Citizens United that the
balance of the states would not be either is unpersuasive. First, the basis for the
conclusion that corruption does not exist in the alleged twenty-six states is unclear. Among other things, the methodology for reaching that conclusion is
unstated, and the nature and reliability of any data require explanation. It is also
unclear whether the lack of corruption in twenty-six states is sustainable.
Second, just because (or even if) some conditions do not exist in certain locales
(that is, in the twenty-six states) as a result of campaign spending, one may not
validly or necessarily argue that they would not pertain in other locales. In
other words, the experience in one location may be different from that in another.
C.

Citizens United -

What About Corruption?

Although the Citizens United majority found that "independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or
the appearance of corruption,, 161 the dissent found the conclusion "unfair as
well as unreasonable," adding that "Congress and outside experts have generated significant evidence corroborating this rationale ....
How contributions may appear and whether contributions may actually
give rise to corruption seem to be questions of fact not readily resolvable by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's decision in that regard appears arbitrary
160

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 968 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissent-

ing): see also Adam Liptak. Justices, 5 4, Reject CorporateSpending Limit, N.Y. TIMEs. Jan. 21.

2010, at Al ("The justices in the majority brushed aside warnings about what might follow from
their ruling in favor of a formal but fervent embrace of a broad interpretation of free speech
rights."); Brief Amici Curiae of Campaign Legal Center, et al. in Support of Appellee on Supplemental Question in Citizens United, 2009 WL 2365222, at *22 ("This Court should not lightly
topple one of the fundamental legal pillars of American elections that has stood for three genera-

tions, and that has successfully prevented aggregated wealth from subverting the electoral system.").
161

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.

162

Id. at 966 (Stevens. J. dissenting).
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and troublesome. That is not the only example of such reasoning in Caperton.
The dissent noted in a related context that "[the majority declares by fiat that
the appearance of undue influence by high-spending corporations will not cause
the electorate to lose faith in our democracy."1 63 According to the dissent, the
majority lacked any substantial basis for its conclusion as to the loss of faith,
in
64
essence "elevating their own optimism into a tenet of constitutional law."',
Finding a set of facts by fiat essentially creates a "new reality" - the
way things are - which may or may not be true; 165 and it does not present a
sound basis for decision. The Supreme Court had the power to do this on the
basis of little or no research or sound or unsound logic since it had the power to
write the decision, its decision is final, and there is no further review. So does a
lifeguard have the power to declare that there is no "shark in the water" and
therefore no danger of shark attacks. But the lifeguard's declaration provides no
consolation to someone who relies on the declaration, goes swimming, encounters the shark, and is eaten.
If the dissent is correct that Citizens United will exacerbate the appearance of corruption in the United States, the price may have been too high to pay,
even if the First Amendment rights of "non-persons" have been increased.
Among other things, it is unclear how helpful First Amendment rights will be in
a corrupt or apparently corrupt environment, including how sustainable the
rights may be. If corruption is afoot, who will enforce our rights? It also remains to be seen how Americans will respond: e.g., adjust to corruption (as has
reportedly occurred in some less developed countries, such as Russia where
66
citizens reportedly do) or seek redress from the holding in Citizens United.1
163

Id. at 963 n.64.

164

Id.

165

In DIARY OF A BAD YEAR, a protagonist made this observation on how a fictitious statement

may turn into a truth that people believe:
It's like makeup. Makeup may be a lie, but not if everyone wears it. If everyone wears makeup, makeup becomes the way things are, and what is the truth
but the way things are?
COETZEE,supra note 125, at 86. Similar frustration with such Supreme Court "fact-finding" appears in an analysis of Caperton,noting:
Caperton based its argument, as Justice Kennedy noted, on "Blankenship's

pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin elected." One wonders how one could
prove that point, at least without a hearing. Kennedy then announces, "[n]ot
every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of
bias that requires ajudge's recusal, but this is an exceptional case." How does
one determine that?
Rotunda, supra note 73, at 272 (footnotes omitted). Cf SUPREME POWER, supra note 116, at 49
(referencing Judge Jerome Frank's criticism of "judges' incantation of 'magical phrases' to create
the appearance of consistency, clarity, and impartiality in decisions where none existed.").
166 With respect to a reportedly factually corrupt Russian legal system, it has been noted that
"corruption [in the judiciary] is part of the status quo to which Russians have adjusted." Kathryn
Hendley, "Telephone Law" and the "Rule of Law ": The Russian Case, I HAGUE J. ON THE RULE
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Caperton as Applied to JudicialElections Following Citizens United How Much Does Caperton Help?

Although Citizens United opened up the possibility of the expenditure
of even more money in judicial elections already beset by too much money,
Capertonrecognized that judicial elections are different and that extensive campaign contributions, under particular circumstances, may create an appearance
of bias and require the judge's recusal. Caperton cautions that in most cases,
however, the problem of apparent bias will not be addressed by the federal constitution; if the states have not acted to pass more stringent recusal rules, the
litigants will be left as they are before the judge in question. As Caperton
states:
It is for this reason that States may choose to "adopt recusal
standards more rigorous than due process requires." 167
Chief Justice Roberts' dissent in Capertonnotes to the same effect:
States are, of course, free to adopt broader recusal rules than the
Constitution requires - and every State has - but these developments 8are not continuously incorporated into the Due Process
16
Clause.
In deferring to state recusal regulations unless the circumstances are extreme, Caperton reacted in a manner characterized as a "timid"'169 response to an

OF L. 231, 261-62 n.57 (2009). The position of the Citizens United dissent is obviously based on

the present facts without the benefit of curative legislation, if any is possible.
167
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009); Bracy v. Gramley,
520 U. S. 899, 904 (1997) (distinguishing the "constitutional floor" from the ceiling set "by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar").
168 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 69 (Roberts. C.J. dissenting).
169 See White. supra note 110. at 150 ("Some observers urge a restrictive view of Caperton.
Fortified by the majority's timid opinion. they argue that the decision is sui generis and must be
confined to its extreme facts."). See also Karlan, supra note 14, at 92 ("[T]he Caperton majority
took some pains to insist that it was not opening the floodgates to litigation challenging the impartiality of state court judges. The "principle" it announced had so many moving parts and was
hedged with so many qualifications .. ") (footnotes omitted).
For a broad statement cautioning that not every campaign contribution to judges should be a problem for judicial impartiality, see Lessig. supra note 95. at 106:
If campaigns were cheap, if contributions were small, if contributors were
many or unknown
in any of those cases, the fact that money was contributed to a judge's campaign could not lead anyone reasonably to believe that
the contribution would effect any particular result. In these cases, money
would be benign, and the raising of money in these cases should not under-

mine trust in the institution of the judiciary, at least for any reasonable soul.
But to suggest that a reasonable soul should discount the effect of money in
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70

As a result,
Caperton may leave many litigants remediless in situations requiring court intervention to present an appearance of judicial impartiality. Although somewhat
"light-handed in policing state court bias," Caperton at least laid down some
constitutional law in this area, some restraining
federal principle. 7 1 Imagine if
72
way.1
other
the
Capertonhad come out
E.

What Should Be Done? What May Be Done?

One should not assume that the Supreme Court made the correct decision in Citizens United just because it was a majority decision; and given the
cases like Blankenship's is to invite an exercise of, as Professor Charles Black
put it, "the sovereign prerogative[] of philosophers -that of laughter."
(footnotes omitted).
170 See White, supra note 110. at 122 (describing her presentation of Caperton to Brazilians
who met her "description of the facts underlying Caperton... with looks of disbelief and bewilderment accompanied by a few audible gasps .... Notwithstanding our countries' different judicial selection methods, the reaction of the Brazilian audience to the Caperton facts was not unlike
the reaction of most American journalists, scholars, and citizens. To most, the facts are alarming.").
171 See Stempel, supra note 87, at 8-9.
Despite its imperfections, Caperton v. Massey is a correctly decided case announcing a workable rule of law. Although the opinion is imperfect (and arguably too light-handed in policing state court bias). the decision deserves
support and not the death-by-a-thousand-cuts criticism of the dissent and its
supporters.
Whatever its imperfections, Caperton likely has changed forever the inertia on
this issue, although it will be neither the immediate dawn of a new day desired
by judicial ethics reformers nor the disaster prophesized by the dissenters.
Id.
See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 95, at 112 (disagreeing with the Supreme Court's decision in
Caperton for institutional reasons, yet also agreeing that Judge Benjamin should have recused
himself:
Thus again, whether Justice Benjamin should have recused himself is in my
172

view a straightforward question: he should have. By not stepping down, he

strengthened the suggestion that money buys results not just in the political
branches, but also in the judicial branch. He had a duty not to impose this cost
upon the West Virginia courts. But the question the Supreme Court had to
address in Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co. was not whether Justice Benjamin behaved badly.
Id.).
The question is whether similarly situated litigants to Caperton would have been better offwithout
any support from the Due Process Clause, and if, so why. The answer is self-evident: such litigants would have lost an important safeguard of judicial impartiality. Caperton vindicated the
principle at least for this case and in these circumstances that he was entitled to a trial before an
impartial judge, regardless whether that judge ultimately votes for or against him: and for similarly situated litigants, that is obviously good news. (Ironically, it would not have mattered to Caperton himself since he ended up losing his case anyway.)
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outcry over the decision, no such assumption is being made. Even the Supreme
Court majority in Citizens United would recognize that as it overruled longstanding precedents established by prior Supreme Court majorities. As Justice
Robert Jackson noted in a much-quoted observation on the correctness (or justice) of Supreme Court decisions:
[R]eversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby
better done. There is no doubt that if there were a superSupreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state
courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we
are
3
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.'
Commentators are divided on the extent of the problems (if any) caused
by Citizens United. Pessimistic and alarmed responses by some express a variety of observations, including describing the case as an out-of control locomotive 4 and "radical."' 75 Others have observed the contrary, focusing on, among
other things, states where campaign finance reforms are similarly limited but
where there are allegedly no adverse consequences. 7 6 As previously noted, the
173 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Moreover, to suggest
that such constitutional interpretation represents "the popular will" as manifested in presidential
elections makes several false assumptions. First, it implies that the public considered positions on
campaign finance reform when voting for Republicans over Democrats and in so doing, the public sought a president likely to appoint justices inclined to strike down campaign finance reform.
Second, even if the decision did represent the popular will, a decision is supposed to reflect an
assessment of the constitutionality of the legislation, not the popular will.
174
See Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive: Did the Roberts Court Misjudge the Public Mood on Campaign Finance Reform?, SLATE. Jan. 25, 2010,
http://www.slate.com/id/2242557/.
There are a good many self-conscious signals in the Citizens United opinion
that the engineer knew deep down that he might be speeding down the track
too swiftly. Fully 15 of Kennedy's 60-page opus are spent explaining why the
court simply could not turn down any of the alternate, less dramatic routes offered up by the parties and amici. The Chief Justice and Alito added many,
similar words in a concurrence, just to emphasize why all this had to happen
right now. Maybe that signals that at the last minute, some of the justices realized there was an unexpected bend in the road. They hurtled ahead anyway.
Id. See also Lanie Rutkow, Jon S. Vernick and Stephen Teret, The Potential Health Effects of
Citizens United, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1356, 1356 (Apr. 2010) (decision gives "corporations
unprecedented influence over the election of the people who determine health policy.")
175 Reid Wilson, Schumer, Van Hollen Push Citizens UnitedFix, THE HOTLINE, Feb. 11. 2010.
http://hotlineoncall.nationaljournal.com/archives/20100/2/schumer van hol.php ("The Supreme
Court's radical decision in the Citizens United case essentially equates corporations with individuals for the purposes of spending money in elections," [Democratic Congressional Committee
Chair and Maryland Congressman Chris Van Hollen] said. "It opens the floodgates to big corporate money that can drown out the voices of American citizens.").
176 See Appellant Amicus Curiae Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America in Support of the Appellant, at 8-9, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
2009 WL 2365220 [hereinafter Appellant Amicus Curiae Brief for the Chamber of Commerce]
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logic of resting on a claim that just because in some states there are no "adverse
consequences" depends on the definition of "adverse consequences," the reliability of the methodology used for determining that there were no such consequences, and, even if there were no such consequences and the methodology
was unexceptionable, the basis for concluding that the same lack of consequences would obtain elsewhere.
Some commentary focuses on the limitations of the decision. For example, the decision only affects independent expenditures, some other types of
spending remain regulated, and certain disclosure laws exist to limit (although
not eliminate) donor secrecy.' 7 Still others occupy a middle ground: they con-

("At least 26 states and the District of Columbia permit corporations (as well as labor unions, and
similar groups) to engage freely in independent electoral advocacy on the same basis as individuals. If Austin were correct in speculating that corporate speech would result in distortions due the
deployment of immense corporate wealth, such effects should appear in these states. The Government offered no such demonstration, nor has the Chamber identified any."). In a Wall Street
Journalinterview, First Amendment specialist Floyd Abrams was reported to have adopted similar views:
Mr. Abrams defends corporate free speech on practical grounds as well, arguing that there is no evidence it causes social harm. Federal regulations do
not apply to campaigns for state and local office, and "over half the states
have allowed unlimited expenditures and contributions by corporations and
unions for a number of years. We haven't seen any explosion of corporate
domination or union domination of the political landscape." Nor are states
without limits more corruption-prone than those with them.
James Taranto, The Media and Corporate Free Speech, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2010, at A13.
177
The author of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's amicus brief in Citizens United, in an article after the decision, elaborated on Citizens United by suggesting the limited scope of the
changes effected by the decision, as follows:
One would think from all this that corporations and unions are now free to buy
candidates on the open market. But what, if anything, will be different in our
elections?
Will corporations and unions be able to give money to candidates or political
parties? No. Federal law, which regulates campaigns for president, the Senate
and the House, prohibits such contributions. The ban was left untouched by
the Supreme Court.
Can corporations spend money in cahoots with candidates and political parties? No. The Supreme Court decision addressed only "independent expenditures," which are, by definition. "not coordinated with a candidate." Monies
spent in collaboration with candidates or parties are treated as contributions
and are still banned.
Perhaps all of this corporate spending will be secret? Wrong again. The Supreme Court upheld the laws that require any corporate or union spender to
file reports with the Federal Election Commission within 24 hours of spending
the first dime.
Jan Witold Baran, Stampede Toward Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at A23. For the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce's Brief, see Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce
of the United
States of America in Support
of Appellant, available at
http://ww.fee.gov/law/litigation/citizens united sc 08 tsae chamberofcommerce.pdf
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tend that the implications are what neither side suggests 178 or even are unknown,
1 79
leaving the subject of what will happen next in the realm of fortune-telling.
According to still another observer, "It's impossible, at the moment, to tell
whether the reaction to Citizens United will be the beginning of a torrential
backlash or will fade into the ether."' 80
F.

Who's Right, How May We Tell, and Does It Matter? Will It Be the
Lady or the Tiger?
1.

What Has Been Done?

If the Citizens United majority is correct, the decisions restricting corporate contributions violated the First Amendment and striking down the campaign finance legislation will have no ill effects. Or, if there are ill effects to
come, the majority does not identify them. If the dissent is correct, the decision will corrupt democracy, certainly without corrective legislation. 8 ' These
hypotheses are partly consistent since a decision
may be correct constitutionally
1 82
effects.
side
unfortunate
to
leads
it
if
even
The majority and minority therefore diverge substantially on likely consequences, and both to some extent seem to rely on predictions. In some sense
178

Posting of Laurence H. Tribe to SCOTUSblog. http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-

should-congress-do-about-citizens-united (Jan. 25. 2010. 20:30 EST) ("I share neither the jubilant
sense that the First Amendment has scored a major triumph over misbegotten censorship nor the
apocalyptic sense that the Court has ushered in an era of corporate dominance that threatens to
drown out the voices of all but the best-connected and to render representative democracy all but
meaningless.").
179 Joseph E. Sandier & Neil P. Reiff, Beware the Fortunetellers,NAT'L L. J.,
Feb. 1. 2010,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nl/PubArticleNLJjsp?id 1202439595364&Beware the
fortunetellers&slreturn=l &hbxlogin=l ("None of this is to say that Citizens United won't make a
real difference in the way money gets channeled in U.S. politics. Chances are it will; it's just very
hard to say exactly how. Democrats and progressives should not be overly discouraged. Republicans should not be overly confident. And next time you see a confident prediction about what the
decision means for the 2010 elections, give it about as much credence as what you could find out
from your local fortuneteller.").
180
Posting of Jeffrey Rosen to The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/robertsversus-robertspage=0,0 (Mar. 2, 2010 12:00 EST).
181
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Does CorporateMoney Lead to Political Corruption,N.Y. TIMES
Jan. 23, 2010, at WKI ("Democrats called the ruling a threat to democracy; Republicans cheered
it as a victory for free speech."); see also id.("In the United States, studies comparing states like
Virginia with scant regulation against those like Wisconsin with strict rules have not found much
difference in levels of corruption or public trust .... The most insistent advocates of the campaign
finance laws argue that the benefits are real even if academics can't measure them.").
182
Some First Amendment absolutists may not be concerned whether the results are adverse or
unpredictable, so long as the results follow from the First Amendment. The problem with that sort
of thinking is what are we supposed to do about the side effects?
There are many acceptable
restrictions on free speech, such as obscenity. defamation, and more; and perhaps some restrictions should be accepted to protect the need for judicial impartiality.
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the "lady or the tiger" analogy seems apt since the answer to the question (will it
harm our democracy?) is difficult to know in advance and the consequence of
making a wrong decision (which will harm democracy) may be disastrous (one
gets the tiger, not the lady). 183 To be fair, sometimes things are mixed, and the
result may partake somewhat of the lady and somewhat of the tiger. In the case
of judicial elections at least, however, it is hard to see how more spending will
help the image of the judiciary as impartial and not beholden to donors and how
more advertising that misinforms or under-informs the electorate will improve
their choice ofjudges.
Of course, those predicting adverse consequences may be incorrect for a
number of reasons. For example, the union or corporate donors may decide not
to contribute or not to contribute much more than they are already doing. Various reasons exist why they might not wish to spend money on political campaigns, including other more pressing priorities, and specifically in the case of
corporations, concerns of alienating their customers or shareholders.1 84 For public companies, reasons for restraint on spending include the need to "deal with
earnings targets, investment analysts [and] rating agencies" as well as demands
for dividends, 85 and for unions, their membership.1 86 According to one observer, the danger of union spending is the greatest of those listed because "most
corporations ...
spend little or nothing on politics and can be expected to do
the same going forward," but labor unions are a different matter. They "can
spend whatever they want on elections with no accountability at all., 18 7 Although such voluntary restraint by corporations or unions is conceivable, a lack
of voluntary restraint is equally conceivable and no one knows whether either or
both will take place. Motorists may voluntarily stop at busy intersections with183 See Bruce A. Campbell & Ruth A. Kollman, The Lady or the Tiger? Opening the Door to

Lawyer Discipline Standards, 1 FL. COASTAL L.J. 231, 231 (1999) ("The lawyer disciplinary system in Texas resembles the fable in which a prisoner is given a choice of two doors, behind which
lurks either happiness or death, sealing his fate. Behind one door beckons a beautiful lady. Behind the other growls a tiger. The prisoner is given no clue to inform his choice. He must simply
decide and take his chances.") (footnotes omitted). The analogy references the short story The
Lady, Or the Tiger (1882) (citing FRANK R. STOCKTON, THE LADY, OR THE TIGER? (Charles

Scribner's Sons 1914) (1884)).
184 Tribe, supra note 178. Among other things, it has been observed that "business corporations are necessarily risk-averse and hesitate to alienate large sectors of their customer and client
base by pouring large sums of money, at least if they must do so openly and visibly, into candidate
campaigns even when their economic interests would clearly be better served by one outcome
rather than by another." Id.
185 Law, supra note 138. at A15. The author is chief legal officer and general counsel of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. According to the author, the "winners" in Citizens United are "organized labor" who "outspend any corporation on politics" or "any group representing business."
Id.
186

Cf id.

187

Id. The author recommends consideration of legislation to address the impact of Citizens

United on union spending so as "to protect the free speech rights of union members who don't
support their leaders' political agenda. and to ensure the integrity of union political activism." Id.
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out stop signs or traffic lights and laws requiring compliance with them, but no
one should rely on motorists doing so.
The dissent in Citizens United observed that some corporations prefer
campaign finance limitations to protect them against demands by politicians for
campaign contributions' 88 in exchange for favorable legislation.18 9 Theoretically, the "shake down issue" may not be as important in the world of judicial politics as in other politics. Any judge who regarded contributions as a prerequisite
for a fair and impartial decision would not only not be "independent," but the
judge would also be factually corrupt.1 90 When contributions are made to judges
by lawyers and litigants, however, appearances alone may sometimes lead to

188

As Justice Stevens' dissent in Citizens United observed, "some corporations have affirma-

tively urged Congress to place limits on their electioneering communications. These corporations
fear that officeholders will shake them down for supportive ads, that they will have to spend increasing sums on elections in an ever-escalating arms race with their competitors, and that public
trust in business will be eroded." Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 973
(2010).
The reference by Justice Stevens to avoiding shakedowns was to an amicus brief by a business
group. which noted:
All of this is not to say that companies do not value their right to speak on issues important to their economic activities. The current statutory regime,
however, does not meaningfully impinge on corporate political speech or even
on corporate involvement in elections. It restricts (1) only electioneering
communications, not issue advocacy and (2) only the use of corporate treasury
funds, not the organization of segregated funds structured to facilitate political
participation. Consequently, the current regime strikes an appropriate balance
between protecting corporations from coerced support for candidates and
permitting corporations to engage in genuine expression.
Amicus Curiae Brief from the Committee for Economic Development in Support of the Appellee,
2009 WL 2365230. at *16 17. To the same effect, see Amicus Brief from the Center for Political
Accountability in Support of the Appellee, 2009 WL 2349016, at *4 ("Corporations will feel
compelled to keep up with their competitors, particularly in the face of a shakedown by elected
officials who write the laws and regulations that corporations must follow on a daily basis.").
All
amicus
briefs
in
Citizens
United
are
also
available
at
http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission#
Supplemental Amicus Briefs.

The corporate shakedown argument was also adopted by E.J. Dionne. Posting by E.J. Dionne to The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/court-and-racket (Mar. 8. 2010.
12:00 EST) ("But conservatives and Republicans should also be alarmed that this decision could
encourage politicians to extort campaign spending from businesses. Is it really so hard to imagine
a congressional leader quietly approaching a business executive and suggesting that unless her
company invested heavily in certain key electoral contests, this regulation or that spending program might be changed at the expense of her enterprise?").
190 See Adam Liptak, Judges Can Solicit Election Funds, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2006 (reporting on a Kentucky case; "Judge Caldwell said that the ban on personal solicitation
might make "direct shakedowns by a corrupt judicial candidate" less likely "because it eliminates
the moment when a judicial candidate can say. 'Contribute to my campaign, and I will rule in your
favor."' But such corruption. she wrote, is already prohibited by other ethics rules and by criminal
laws.").
189
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sinister conclusions:1 91 namely, that in exchange for campaign contributions, the
judge expressly or impliedly agreed
to rule in the contributors' favor or at least
92
that is why the contributors paid.
2.

What May Be Done?

A constitutional amendment, of course, may be sought overruling the
decision, such as one expressly providing that the First Amendment is not intended to reach such campaign finance legislation or granting Congress the
power to legislate campaign finance reform of the sort invalidated by the Supreme Court. The difficulties of such an amendment process are well known,
although interest in such an amendment and how it would read has arisen following Citizens United.19 3 Also, poll evidence suggests broad popular dissatisfaction with the decision, which might make the possibility of an amendment
more promising than usual, which is not to say "promising."', 94
As President
191

See, e.g.. Carrington. supra note 156, at 91 ("Judicial candidates receive money from law-

yers and litigants appearing in their courts; rarely are there contributions from any other source.
Even when the amounts are relatively small, the contributions look a little like bribes or shakedowns related to the outcomes of past or future lawsuits."); Grimes, supra note 15, at 865 ("Almost all contributions to judicial candidates come from attorneys and litigants who expect to come
before those to whom they are contributing. Attorneys and litigants appear to give significant
contributions to judicial candidates for one of two reasons: they hope the contributions will sway
judges in their favor, or they seek the election of those with judicial philosophies attuned to their
interests."): Shugerman, supra note 14. at 1065 ("It has been a long-established practice for parties and lawyers to donate to the judges who will later hear their cases, but recently the size of
such donations has increased dramatically.").
192
See James Lindgren. Blackmail: Morals: The Theory, History and Practice of the BriberyExtortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695, 1711 (1993) (describing a corrupt taking "without
an explicit quid pro quo," as follows: ...An elected judge approaches a lawyer in a major case
pending before the judge and says, 'I haven't heard from you yet. Would you donate $ 100,000 to
my re-election fund?"').
193
As for passing a constitutional amendment to undo Citizens United, speculation focuses on
the difficulty in doing so as is virtually always the case. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare
Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A12 [hereinafter Rare Rebuke] ("The
sharp attack from the president, echoing those of other Democrats and their allies, suggested that
the left has found a decision to rail against, even if there is not much that can be done about it....
The core of the Citizens United decision said corporations have a First Amendment right to make
independent expenditures in candidate elections. Only a constitutional amendment, which is exceedingly unlikely, could undo that core holding."); but see Lawrence Lessig, Change Congress,
Professor Lawrence Lessig's Essay on the Need for a Constitutional Amendment, available at
http://action.change-congress.org/page/s/amendpetition#essay (advocating constitutional amendment);
Posting
by
Lawrence
Lessig
to
The
New
Republic,
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/citizens-unite (Mar. 16, 2010, 12:00 EST) (suggesting amendment to this effect: "[nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to restrict the power to
limit, though not to ban, campaign expenditures of non-citizens of the United States during the
last 60 days before an election. ").
194
Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html; see id:
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Obama suggested in his 2010 State of the Union address, perhaps legislation
short of such an amendment will be helpful to ameliorate some anticipated effects of the decision:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the
Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will
open the floodgates for special interests - including foreign
corporations - to spend without limit in our elections. . . . I
don't think American elections should be bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities....
They should be decided by the American people. And I'd urge
Democrats and Republicans
to pass a bill that helps to correct
1 95
some of these problems.
Suggested legislative responses are already emerging, including enhancing corporate contribution disclosure requirements, 196 creating a federal cause of
Nearly three-quarters of self-identified conservative Republicans say they oppose the Supreme Court ruling, with most of them strongly opposed. Some
two-thirds of conservative Republicans favor congressional efforts to limit
corporate and union spending. though with less enthusiasm than liberal Democrats.
See also Dionne, supra note 189 ("A Washington Post-ABC News poll last month found that
seventy-six percent of Republicans were opposed to the ruling, along with eighty-one percent of
independents and eighty-five percent of Democrats.").
195
Barack Obama, State of the Union Address. Jan. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/us/politics/28obama.text.html?hp &pagewanted all
(applause references deleted). The President's observations about Citizens United were the subject of
Adam Liptak's January 29, 2010. article in the New York Times. Rare Rebuke, supra note 193 ("It
is not unusual for presidents to disagree publicly with Supreme Court decisions. But they tend to
do so at news conferences and in written statements, not to the justices' faces.") For more on the
controversy resulting from the State of the Union speech, see Posting by Helene Cooper to the
Caucus,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/10 /white-house-spars-with-the-chiefjustice/?hp (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:05 EST). Among other things, the article involved negative comments on the President's reference to Citizens United during the speech by Chief Justice Roberts
and a response by White House press secretary Robert Gibbs. quoted as follows:
"What is troubling is that this decision opened the floodgates for corporations
and special interests to pour money into elections - drowning out the voices
of average Americans. The president has long been committed to reducing the
undue influence of special interests and their lobbyists over government. That
is why he spoke out to condemn the decision and is working with Congress on
a legislative response to close this loophole."
Id. Roberts specifically objected to "the political scene surrounding the State of the Union
speech" when the President made his observations on the case. Id.
196
Tribe, supra note 178. With respect to enhanced disclosure requirements, Professor Tribe
notes:
The disclaimer should have to include a statement by the corporate sponsor's

CEO, by name, providing information about how much of the corporation's
general treasury was being expended in aggregate on the communication in
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action for corporate waste arising from contributions, 19 7 and improving corporate accountability to shareholders by requiring notice of expenditures.1 98 Still
other proposed measures include banning "expenditures from corporations with
a high percentage of foreign ownership; from corporations that win federal contracts; and from those that received TARP funds"; 199 and enhancing disclosure

question and certifying the CEO's personal conclusion, as in Sarbanes-Oxley.
that making the expenditure from general treasury funds, as opposed to making it through a corporate PAC, significantly advances the corporation's business interest.
Id.
Id. With respect to a federal cause of action for corporate waste by making political expenditures, Professor Tribe notes:
For example, it could provide a greater incentive for suit, by offering statutory
damages or treble damages (i.e., reimbursement of three times the challenged
expenditure, part of which reimbursement would go directly to the plaintiffs
rather than into the corporation's coffers). as well as attorneys' fees, and it
could provide better deterrence by imposing individual liability for the corporate officers authorizing the improper political expenditure. And the "business
judgment" rule making such cases notoriously difficult to bring under state
law could be replaced with a rule less deferential to management and more focused on the existence of a convincing justification for using general treasury
funds as such rather than relying entirely on PAC funds contributed by people
with politics in mind.
197

Id.
Q98
Monica Youn, Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York Univ. School of Law,
Testimony before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 3, 2010)
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/monica youns testimony
for the subcommittee on the constitution civil right/ ("[F]irst, require managers to obtain
authorization from shareholders before making political expenditures with corporate treasury
funds; and second, require managers to report corporate political spending directly to shareholders. These requirements will increase corporate accountability by placing the power directly in the
hands of the shareholders, thereby ensuring that shareholders' funds are used for political spending only if that is how the shareholders want their money spent.") To the same effect, see Ciara
Torres-Spelliscy, Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York Univ. School of Law,
Testimony before the Comm. on House Administration, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 3,
2010)
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/ciara torresspelliscys testimony for the committee on house administration/.
199 These are suggestions reportedly backed by New York Senator Charles Schumer and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman Chris Van Hollen. See Wilson, supra note
175 ("Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and DCCC chair Chris Van Hollen announced Thursday they
will begin work on a legislative framework aimed at tightening limits on certain corporate expenditures and outright banning others after last month's Citizens Unitedv. FEC ruling."); see also Eric
Lichtblau, Democrats Push to Require Corporate Campaign Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2010 ("The Democrats' proposal would require corporations or groups like labor unions, advocacy groups and so-called 527 organizations that are involved in political expenditures to identify all
their financial donors or set up separate accounts to handle political spending and identify the
donors to that account .... With some exceptions, the proposal would also ban political expendi-

tures by government contractors, companies that received bailout money from the government

under the Troubled Asset Relief Program and companies that have more than 20 percent foreign
ownership."); Summary of Citizens United Legislation Introduced by Senator Charles E. Schumer
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requirements, including by requiring "corporations and unions to make public
details of what they spend [in contributions] directly or through advocacy
groups.,,20 0 The likelihood of success of any legislation is beyond the scope of
this Article, and even if passed, some may result in court challenges against it
under Citizens Unitedas indirect means to abridge free speech.0 1
Will more or less extreme candidates benefit from Citizens United? Because more extreme and presumably less impartial candidates may attract more
funds, such candidacies might become more attractive after Citizens United.20 2
&
Congressman
Chris
Van
Hollen,
available
at
http://static .firedoglake.com/37/files/2010/02/schumer-vanhollen.pdf.
200
David D. Kirkpatrick, Democrats Try to Rebuild Campaign Spending Barriers,N.Y. TiIES,
Feb. 12, 2010. at A19 [hereinafter Democrats Try to Rebuild Barriers] (identifying proposals,

including "[i]f a corporation paid for a political commercial, the company's chief executive would
be required to appear at the end taking responsibility, just as political candidates must now do. If
an advocacy group or trade association paid for a commercial, the biggest donor would be required to appear and the five biggest corporate contributors would be listed by name."); Lichtblau,
supra note 199.
In supporting legislative reform, outgoing United States Senator Evan Bayh explicitly
noted the threat that he saw from Citizens United:
The recent Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, allowing corporations and unions to spend freely on ads explicitly
supporting or opposing political candidates, will worsen matters. The threat of
unlimited amounts of negative advertising from special interest groups will
only make members more beholden to their natural constituencies and more
afraid of violating party orthodoxies.
I can easily imagine vulnerable members approaching a corporation or union
for support and being told: "We'd love to support you, but we have a rule. We
only support candidates who are with us at least 90 percent of the time. Here
is our questionnaire with our top 10 concerns. Fill it out." Millions of campaign dollars now ride on the member's response. The cause of good government is not served.
Evan Bayh, Why I'm Leaving the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, at WK9.
201
Democrats Try To Rebuild Barriers, supra note 200 ("leading legal critic of campaignfinance rules, noted that the court had often disapproved of indirect efforts to accomplish objectives it has already found unconstitutional - such as, in this case, banning political commercials
paid for by corporations."). But see id. ("Several legal scholars said that the many disclosure
requirements in the measure appeared to stand on firmer constitutional ground than the full bans
on political commercials by foreign companies or government contractors. The court has frowned
on speech restrictions aimed at specific speakers and leaned toward disclosure as a constitutionally permissible response to fears of corruption or und[ue] influence."). Professor Lawrence Lessig
has criticized the proposed legislation and instead called for a constitutional amendment and other
legislation to address Citizens United. See Posting of Lawrence Lessig to Fix Congress First!
http://www.fixcongressfirst.org/blog/entry/breaking-congresss-response-to-citizensunited/#reactions (Feb. 11, 2010) (the proposed legislation is "filled with ideas that either won't
work or that, if they worked, would only invite the Supreme Court to strike again.").
202
As for more extreme candidates, see Dorothy Samuels. Hanging a "ForSale" Sign Over
the Judiciary,N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A22 (quoting Professor James Sample, Hofstra Law
School, and noting as follows: "The accelerated money war, [Professor Sample] warns, will inevitably polarize the bench "because more moderate candidates are unlikely to be considered a
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Alternatively, more moderate candidates may receive funding because they may
203
be perceived as more likely to win.
Both suppositions are reasonable although
not presently verifiable.
Because of the anticipated effect of contributions on state court judicial
elections, other responses suggested have included amending state constitutions
so as to introduce judicial appointment systems instead of elections. 2 4 The
struggle to obtain appointment systems within the states is ongoing and wellknown, but eliminating judicial elections would obviously eliminate the effect
of Citizens United on those elections by removing money from the process of
selecting judges. It would also eliminate the need for recusal motions under
Capertonbecause of campaign contributions or expenditures.
G.

A Short Lesson on JudicialIndependence and an HistoricalInterlude

In light of the intensity of the reaction to Citizens United, it is a good
time to reflect on judicial independence. Although classic support for judicial
independence has justified it in terms of empowering judges to make unpopular
decisions, the independence sought is not unmixed. Judicial independence is
presumably independence to make decisions like the pro-integration decisions in
the South during the civil rights era, as opposed to deciding cases like Lochner
in the early part of the twentieth century 0 5 and other reviled or discredited deci206
sions.
From the comments made by some opponents of Citizens United, one
bankable vote by any special interest group investing heavily in judicial campaigns."). The article
recommends reforms including moving toward an appointive system for the selection ofjudges or
expediting the disqualification of judges through "adopting strict rules that bar judges from ruling
in cases involving major financial supporters." Id. An appropriate rule might consider excluding
judges from hearing cases involving various financial supporters beyond (and not limited to) their
"major financial supporters" such as in Caperton.
203 For a view that moderate candidates are more likely to receive financial support in elections
following Citizens United, see Laurent Belsie, Citizens United: What the Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign Money Means for You, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,

Jan. 21,

2010,

http://www.csmonitor.com/Money/new-economy/2010/0121 /Citizens-United-What-the-SupremeCourt-s-decision-on-campaign-money-means-for-you ("Who are corporations (or unions or any
other special interest, for that matter) going to back: mavericks or mainstream candidates? They'll
back the mainstream, because those candidates have the best chance of winning.").
204
Tony Mauro, Reformers Hope High Court Decision Will Kill JudicialElections, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 1. 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id 1202439680529.
205 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
206
See, e.g., State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947): Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944): Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Lochner, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857); see Norman L. Greene, Appointive Selection of Judges, Limited JurisdictionCourts with
Aon-Lawyer Judiciaries,and Judicial Independence, 43 CT. R. 80, 97 et seq. (2007) (analyzing
judicial independence and observing that although judges are acclaimed for acting against the
popular will to make decisions (such as in school desegregation cases). some decisions are legitimately unpopular and perhaps should not result in such acclaim on the basis of their unpopularity).
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might assume that there are limits to the support for the making of unpopular
decisions, even from proponents of judicial independence.
The unpopularity or potential consequences of Citizens Unitedpresent a
moment for historical reflection as well. Consider the possibility of a bad decision (or series of decisions) of the United States Supreme Court opposed by
masses of the American public - for example, precedents that threatened to
exacerbate the current bad economic situation - decided on the basis of "doctrinaire logic" or "wooden application" of rules ''2°7 or even on a well-grounded
and unimpeachable constitutional basis. Such decisions bring to mind another
era in which extreme measures were considered and rejected, such as President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's plan to "pack the court," or as he later suggested, "to
20 8
compel it, by the application of pressure, to assume a more liberal outlook.
The plan, which was entitled the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, would
have enabled the President to add judges other than through the ordinary appointment process, as follows:
The Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, which provided for
broad reform of the federal judicial system, allowed President
Roosevelt to appoint an additional member to the Supreme
Court for every sitting justice over the age of seventy, which

207

"Doctrinaire" interpretations of constitutional provisions regardless of social consequences

have also led to observations like Robert Jackson's dissent in Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 U.S. 1
(1949), as follows:
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty means
the removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all local attempts to

maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. The choice is not
between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy with-

out either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire
logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact.
Id. at 36 (Jackson. J. dissenting). To the same effect is Justice Stevens' observation in Citizens

United ("In a democratic society. the longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden application of judge-made rules.") Citizens United.,
130 S. Ct. at 979 (Stevens. J. dissenting)). What is "doctrinaire logic" or "wooden application"

and what is not, of course, may also be subjective - what is doctrinaire or wooden to some may
be fair constitutional interpretation to others.
Although taking into account whether constitutional interpretation leads to unacceptably adverse
consequences may be unobjectionable. a dispute may arise over what is "adverse" and what is
"unacceptably adverse." A further issue is whether the Supreme Court is in the best position to
assess adverse effects as compared to other branches of government, such as the legislature following fact-finding hearings.
Of course, the ability of the legislature to modify court decisions through legislation provides an
important safety valve as does the ability to seek constitutional change. The burden of the constitutional process in many cases may make that safety valve little more than theoretical, however.
208 SUPREME POWER, supra note 116, at 502.
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would have resulted in a total of six new justices at the time the
bill was introduced. 0 9

United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Recess Reading: An Occasional Feature
From the Judiciary Committee, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Court Packing" Plan, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/about/history/CourtPacking.cfm (last visited Apr. 5. 2010). The plan
was described by President Roosevelt in a fireside chat as follows:
What is my proposal? It is simply this: whenever a judge or justice of any federal court has reached the age of seventy and does not avail himself of the opportunity to retire on a pension. a new member shall be appointed by the president then in office, with the approval, as required by the Constitution. of the
Senate of the United States.
That plan has two chief purposes. By bringing into the judicial system a
steady and continuing stream of new and younger blood, I hope, first, to make
the administration of all federal justice. from the bottom to the top, speedier
and, therefore, less costly; secondly, to bring to the decision of social and economic problems younger men who have had personal experience and contact
with modern facts and circumstances under which average men have to live
and work. This plan will save our national Constitution from hardening of the
judicial arteries.
The number of judges to be appointed would depend wholly on the decision
of present judges now over seventy, or those who would subsequently reach
the age of seventy.
If, for instance, any one of the six justices of the Supreme Court now over the
age of seventy should retire as provided under the plan. no additional place
would be created. Consequently, although there never can be more than fifteen, there may be only fourteen, or thirteen, or twelve. And there may be only
nine.
There is nothing novel or radical about this idea. It seeks to maintain the federal bench in full vigor. It has been discussed and approved by many persons
of high authority ever since a similar proposal passed the House of Representatives in 1869.
Why was the age fixed at seventy? Because the laws of many states, and the
practice of the civil service, the regulations of the Army and Navy, and the
rules of many of our universities and of almost every great private business
209

enterprise, commonly fix the retirement age at seventy years or less.

The statute would apply to all the courts in the federal system. There is general approval so far as the lower federal courts are concerned. The plan has met
opposition only so far as the Supreme Court of the United States itself is concerned. But, my friends, if such a plan is good for the lower courts, it certainly
ought to be equally good for the highest Court, from which there is no appeal.
History and Politics Out Loud, President Roosevelt's Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the
Judiciary, March 9, 1937, availableat http://www.hpol.org/fdr/chat/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
Among other things, today such a plan would be objectionable to some because of the references
to "new and younger blood" and the suggestion that judges at age seventy lack "full vigor." (Life
expectancy and health are undoubtedly better now.) Even when proposed. the age-based restriction was an issue. For instance, certain proponents were concerned that the plan would be per-

ceived "as a slur against a perfectly able and thoroughly progressive old judge [referencing Justice
Brandeis who was then on the Court.]" SUPREME POWER, supra note 116, at 263-64. Undoubtedly
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The era into which the bill was introduced has been described as follows:
By 1937. the Court's majority had made amply clear that the
very notion of the New Deal - its use of governmental power
to relieve the suffering caused by the Great Depression and to
create a new and more just social and economic order- was an
affront to the Constitution, whether that power was exercised by
the federal government or the states .... If reform was now impossible, so was recovery.210
To the same effect was President Roosevelt's response to the Schecter
decision2 11 which struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act. According
to the President, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Interstate Commerce
Clause of the federal constitution was drawn from another era and prevented the
government from addressing the nation's economic problems:
The implications of this decision . . .are more important than
any decision probably since the Dred Scott case, because they
bring the country as a whole up against a very practical question .... [D]oes this decision mean that the United States government has no control over any national economic problem?"... Would Americans stand for that? Or would they give
their federal government - like that of "every other nation in
the world" - the power to apply national solutions to national
problems... " We have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy
212
definition of interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court's eradication of minimum wage legislation in
another case led to particular outrage. 213 "For most Americans, 'the liberty of

today when some think of the plan. however, they focus on the change of personnel on the Court,
rather than the age-based mechanism for effecting change.
But according to plan proponent and then Attorney General Homer Cummings, "age defined
outlook," and older judges have "'come to view the world with eyes of the past."' Id. at 208; see
also id. at 209 (citing columnist Arthur irock ("Probably the faults of the system could be reduced if there were an age limit for justices who have served more than a certain number of years.
Aged men often grow remote from the world, unsympathetic to change. shackled to their prejudices.")); see also id at 207 ("There had never been a time when the Court was not composed
mostly or entirely of venerable men. Their age was a tempting target- particularly for critics on
the left, who ... saw the Court as a brake on progress ... .
210

Id. at 3.

211

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

212 SUPREME POWER, supra note 116, at 148-50.
21,

Morehead v. New York Ex Rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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contract' was an abstraction; 'the liberty to starve,'
2 14

937

was, for many, reali-

ty."

The court-packing plan has been often considered a misguided attack on
judicial independence.21 5 An historian of the period has cautioned President Obama that this "is an analogy to avoid,' 2 6 and the "only sure way [for the president] to change the court's direction [in the Roosevelt era] was to change its
members when vacancies occurred" and that is true now.2' 7 Also, other factors
may effect change: the "Supreme Court does not operate in a vacuum ...

and

[j]ustices are human, and are open to influence by public events and political
pressure.,,21 8 But it is understandable how reasonable minds might have considered such extreme measures appropriate during the New Deal era to avoid a
greater evil, such as the destitution of large portions of the American public.219
214 SUPREME POWER. supra note 116, at 222 (quoting THE NEW REPUBLIC); see also id. at 221
22 ("The sacred right of liberty of contract again
the right of an immature child or a helpless
woman to drive a bargain with a great corporation. If this decision does not outrage the moral
sense of the country. then nothing will." ([quoting then Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes]
"The condemnation, this time, was near universal.").
215 From the historical perspective, there is no need to defend the plan. It lost, the Supreme
Court shifted its views anyway, and history moved on. The details of the plan barely matter, although, as noted above, the idea of considering 70-year old judges old in this age of greater sensitivity to age discrimination might be unpopular. The main point is that this was an effort to
change decision-making at the Supreme Court by changing court personnel other than through the
normal appointment process.
216

Justices Will Prevail, supra note 116 (raising court-packing retrospective as a response to

Citizens United and suggesting that the President not "lead the charge."). Shesol was not specifically considering an effort to pack the court, but rather the president's escalating "war of words
with the court." Id.; see Cooper, supra note 195. Shesol noted that the "justices are not easily
intimidated;" the president [Obama]'s critics would portray him as "unconcerned with the independence of the judiciary and eager to consolidate power in his own hands;" and in any case, "[i]f
the Roberts court, like the court led by Charles Evans Hughes in the 1930's. continues to defy
popular opinion as flagrantly as it did in Citizens United, American might well turn against it....
In that event, progressives might well erupt in protest; Congress might be tempted to curb the
court." Justices Will Prevail, supranote 116.
Cf E-mail from Barry Friedman. Jacob D. Fuchsberg Professor of Law, New York University
School of Law. to author (Mar. 14, 2010) (on file with the West irginiaLaw Review) [hereinafter
Friedman E-mail] ("President Obama should be strategic and careful and not go over the line but
the Supreme Court is not immune from criticism and the president is the criticizer in chief').
Professor Friedman is the author of THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
217
See Justices Will Prevail. supra note 116. According to Shesol, "Patience, in the face of

pressing national challenges. is hard. But change, as is now amply clear, does not come quickly."

Id. Cf Friedman E-mail, supra note 216 (Supreme Court not immune from criticism and president is criticizer in chief).
218 See Justices Will Prevail, supranote 116.
219 For a history of the period in addition to Jeff Shesol's writings, see also, e.g., Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201 (1994); Barry Friedman, The History of

the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971, 1049
(2000) [hereinafter Friedman. The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty].
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Indeed, in a "fireside chat" at the time discussing the plan, President Roosevelt
explained his reasoning, including the need "to meet the unanswered challenge
of one-third of a Nation ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed" 220 as well as expressed his belief in the importance of an "independent judiciary" and the "rule
of law," concepts which some would assume would dictate against the courtpacking plan.22'
President Roosevelt's New Deal goals were "savaged" by the Supreme Court, which struck "down
no less than sixteen New Deal laws within a thirteen-month period" and his program was in
"shambles."
Henry J. Abraham, Judicial Independence in the United States, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 32
(2001). The court packing plan sparked a "firestorm of opposition ... within the halls of Congress, the press, and the public, the proposed legislation being perceived for what, in fact, it was:
an assault on judicial independence." Id.
"Court packing is by no means the only way in which political authorities may abuse the power
they possess over judicial structure." Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial
Independence. in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

FROM AROUND THE WORLD 14 (2001) (mentioning, among other things, stripping "courts of their
jurisdiction to adjudicate matters in which the government of the day has a vital interest .. ").Of
course, the concept of taking extreme measures to avoid evil can be and has been used to take
measures in the name of national security at the expense of civil liberties.
President Obama's response to Citizens United, as noted above, was the measured one of calling
for legislative change to respond to the Court's ruling, noting, "And I'd urge Democrats and Republicans to pass a bill that helps to correct some of these problems." Obama, supra note 193.
Chief Justice Roberts may not have considered the President's approach so "measured," however.
See Cooper, supra note 195.
220
Consider President Roosevelt's speech to the nation on the court-packing plan, noting the
need to avoid an economic "catastrophe."
Reform, 9 NEv. L.J. 79, 119-20 (2008):

See Terence J. Lau, Judicial Independence: A Callfor

On March 9, 1937. President Roosevelt took his case for the court-packing
plan to the public. In one of his famous "fireside chats," he outlined the issue.
the stakes and his solution. Certain portions of his speech are worth reprinting
here:
The Courts, however, have cast doubts on the ability of the elected Congress
to protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern social and
economic conditions. We are at a crisis in our ability to proceed with that protection ....
I want to talk with you very simply about the need for present action in this
crisis
the need to meet the unanswered challenge of one-third of a Nation
ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed.
(footnotes omitted.)
See also President Roosevelt's Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary. supra note 209.
221 See President Roosevelt's Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary, supra note 209:
We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation where we must take action to
save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. We must find a
way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We
want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution and not
over it. In our courts we want a government of laws and not of men.
I wantas all Americans want- an independent judiciary as proposed by
the framers of the Constitution. That means a Supreme Court that will enforce
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It is likewise understandable why reasonable minds might oppose such
court-altering plans - despite anger at the Supreme Court - in light of institutional imperatives. At the time of the conservative New Deal decisions, the
public both opposed the decisions and the effort to alter the Supreme Court. 222
The opposition even came from the farm movement and organized labor.' 23
Intimidating the Court may also weaken it and lead it to defer too much to the
other branches of government when the opposite is required.22 4
Court-packing, in addition to disturbing judicial independence, may
well be ineffective in achieving the result proponents of a plan would seek. For
example, adding new justices would only assist the opponents of a series of decisions if it could be accurately predicted how new judges would vote in a case
involving the same issues and if they would continue to vote in that manner.
Furthermore, supporting such a course of action might open the door to
even less palatable approaches. While changing the make-up of the New Deal
Supreme Court to preserve Roosevelt's legislative agenda may have had surface
appeal to supporters of the New Deal frustrated by the Supreme Court, the same
procedure invoked by another President to alter the make-up of the Supreme
Court after Brown v. Board of Education225 in order to slow the process of integration would have been regarded by some as far more troublesome, if not evil.

222

the Constitution as written, that will refuse to amend the Constitution by the
arbitrary exercise of judicial power
in other words by judicial say-so. It
does not mean a judiciary so independent that it can deny the existence of
facts which are universally recognized.
See Friedman, History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty. supra note 219, at 1049:

[T]he public was extremely angry about Supreme Court decisions and the
Court's constant interference with the New Deal agenda. At the same time,
many parts of that same public - including those who favored the New Deal
measures struck down by the courts - opposed the Court-packing plan. This
phenomenon was confirmed by Gallup polls that showed both dissatisfaction
with Court decisions and opposition to tinkering with the Court. As Thurman
Arnold explained, "much of the opposition to the proposal came not from
those who were opposed but from those in favor of the main outlines of the
Roosevelt policies," including the farm movement and organized labor. In addition, many members of Congress were enthusiastic New Dealers who were
eager to solve the Court problem, but insisted on doing so by constitutional
amendment, rather than by Court packing.
(footnotes omitted).
Whether and to what extent the public is angry about Citizens United- as Professor Friedman
contends that they were angry about New Deal decisions -is unclear. Clearly, a segment of the
public is incensed, as press stories and poll data indicate, but such sources may not be the best of
evidence: and even if the press stories and data are accurate, it is unclear whether the anger is
sustainable. It remains to be seen how important Citizens United will be in the public's list of
priorities.
223

Id.

224

See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, II,

THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME

COURT DECISIONS 217 (2006).
225 Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

67

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

Yet the Supreme Court is not immune from criticism, and criticism
sometimes leads to change. Neither academics, journalists (what else is a free
press for?), politicians, nor other members of the public need be silent and accepting in the face of Supreme Court decisions. Although the court-packing
plan failed, the Supreme Court began to uphold New Deal legislation, the President tookofcredit
for thethechange,
andCourt
manyjustices
others agreed. 226 According to an
historian
the period,
Supreme
were not merely judges; they were men - politically minded
and socially aware men. All, to varying degrees, were attuned
to changes in the climate of opinion and mindful of the level of
public esteem for their institution and themselves as individuals.
They were, again to different degrees, open to influence by legal briefs, oral arguments, pressure from their peers, and, not
least, national events. 27
The subject remains an area of ongoing
scholarly interest and debate,
228
even (and some might say especially) now.
H.

What Did the U.S. Supreme Court Do? What Should Americans Do?

Controlling the appearance of corruption and other types of corruption
through campaign finance reform has been regarded as settled policy, even if the
effectiveness of the policy could not be demonstrated through mathematical
models. 229 On the basis of precedent alone ("that's the way we've been doing it
for years"), the approach could have been upheld.
226

SUPREME POWER, supra note 116, at 522 ("To most who had witnessed the [court-packing]

fight (and many who had not), it seemed self-evident that the [Supreme] Court had bent before the
storm."). Cf id. at 523 (noting scholarly disagreement as to the reason for the change in the
Court's decisions). See also ROOSEVELT. supra note 224, at 217 (declining to resolve dilemma.
noting that measures such as a court-packing proposal may be effective in creating change, but
adding that some point out that the Supreme Court during the New Deal was rethinking its jurisprudence "before the announcement of the plan and would have proceeded without it.").
227

SUPREME POWER, supra note 116, at 523 24.

228 Scholars still debate and consider the propriety of Roosevelt's threats to pack the Supreme
Court. See Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 14

(2001) ("Whether Roosevelt's threat was justified depends on one's overall evaluation of the
situation of the United States at that time and the long-term consequences of Roosevelt's action
for constitutional democracy."): Justices Will Prevail,supra note 116.
229
Judges need not work with mathematical precision, however. Were a judge to strike down
campaign finance reform without mathematical proof that campaign spending has a corrupting or
other undesirable influence
and it did
our democratic processes might be damaged in the
meantime until the proof. if ever, came in. It therefore might be a reasonable approach for a judge
to assess that the First Amendment risks are less significant than the corruption risks and uphold

the law. Sometimes policymakers need to work with the best available information or take the
risk of societal harm if they fail to act. Cf Perspectives From the Rule of Law, supra note 18, at
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In addition, campaign finance reform could have been preserved on the
theory of necessity. It was observed even before Citizens United that campaign
finance limitations in judicial elections were essential to preserve judicial independence - even if they impinged on speech. "[E]xpenditure restrictions limit
political speech [even in judicial elections]," but "this is constitutional because
it is the only apparent way to achieve an undoubtedly compelling interest: preserving an independent judiciary in the face of the corrosive effects of ever larger spending in judicial elections. 230
The principal dilemma for the court was instead as follows: if it upheld
the legislation, First Amendment freedoms (as it saw them) might have been
adversely affected and if it struck it down (as it did), there was a risk of harm to
the interests the campaign finance laws were intended to protect. Citizens United resolved the dilemma by overweighting what it identified as First Amendment interests and underweighting or discounting the other competing interests
that campaign finance reform was intended to address. (The only exception was
through its approval of the existing disclaimer and disclosure legislation.)
But what about controlling an increase in spending on judicial election
campaigns? As of now, voluntary restraint (by corporations and others) stands
in the way of increased spending on independent expenditures in judicial elections as a result of Citizens United, and the risks of such spending are enhanced.
Whether we will see a worsened judicial selection climate is now in the area of
speculation, guess work, and premonition. If past spending foretells future
spending, there will be more expensive races, unless opponents are exaggerating
the likely effects of the decision. But whether the past predicts the future is presently unclear.
Whether curative activity, either legislative or constitutional, is possible
is up to the political process and ultimately, American citizens and their representatives. But to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, and at the risk of overdramatizing the situation, this might be a time to take action to preserve, if not the
republic itself, then an important element of it as well as the rule of law
namely, an impartial judiciary."'
CONCLUSION

Consider the problem of knowing that the judge is biased
againstyou or your client or so it appears,and the judge refuses to step down from your case. How can a lawyer represent

82. ("Policymakers (including international financial institutions) and companies and their CEOs
may (and will) act on the basis of sound policy, logic and common sense. None of these factors
requires a demonstration of causation to a reasonable degree of social scientific certainty.").
230
Chemerinsky, supra note 149, at 149; see also id. at 143 ("differences between judicial
candidates and those running for Congress or President.").
231

Horton, supra note 11.
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his client under these circumstances, and how can a client accept an adverse verdict as legitimate?
America's ability effectively to address the risk of judicial bias is in
doubt, and if not properly addressed, may only be continuing to deteriorate, and,
as Justice O'Connor noted, will get worse "soon., 232 To answer the question
posed by the title to this Article, therefore, America is willing - or at least is
prepared - to accept too much risk of judicial bias. How much risk is too
much? Even small percentages may be unacceptable. For instance, if the risk
were too high in just one percent of the cases, that might be many, many cases,
despite the small percentage. If the risk were too high in twenty-five percent of
the cases, would we be prepared to accept that, even if that were to mean that in
the "vast majority of cases," there is no problem? (Seventy-five percent certainly does qualify as the "vast majority.").
Capertondid not do enough to remedy the problem of bias, and Citizens
United did not help either. How is it that our collection of precedents and laws
has collectively gotten us to this juncture? Even assuming that each individual
precedent was correctly decided, are we prepared to live with the results overall? If Americans do not face up to this problem, how are things going to improve? Answering these questions is a first step in trying to do something about
bias in our courts.
Caperton did establish a vague Due Process limit for bias where campaign contributions were "extreme" and untimely- i.e., made when the beneficiary judicial candidate was likely to hear the case if he or she prevailed in the
election. But nothing was changed as a matter of federal constitutional law for
the less "extreme" cases, except to leave the remedy to the states as before if the
states chose to act. As of the time of this Article, very little has been done by
the states to tighten their recusal procedures. But there is still time for the states
to respond. Not even a year has passed since the decision. On the positive side,
Caperton avoided a substantial problem: a contrary decision in that case would
have sent a troubling message that money does not matter and given the states
even weaker encouragement to improve their procedures. Matters could have
been worse.
But Caperton was a precarious decision, since there were four dissenters. Chief Justice Roberts, supported by some subsequent commentary, would
not have granted relief even here: he was principally concerned with a potential
outbreak of recusal litigation. That combined with Justice Kennedy's limited
decision stressing the extreme facts might make it difficult for the next Caperton motion that comes before the Supreme Court. But things did work out this
time for Caperton. The Supreme Court did step in here to rescue him (even by
one vote). (It is curious that "rescue" and "recuse" have the same letters.) That
is at least "something," at least until he lost again in West Virginia.
232

FormerJustice O'Connor Sees i1. supra note 157.
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Even before Citizens United, judicial elections have been regarded as
tainted by money, which has impaired the appearance of judicial impartiality.2 33
This problem will remain so long as there are elections and the need to raise
money and secure votes. On the theory that more money in judicial politics is
worse than less, Citizens United potentially worsens judicial elections since
more expenditures are possible in more races. But the emphasis should be on the
words "worsens" and "more expenditures."
It is interesting that Caperton, with its massive campaign spending,
emerged from the old pre-Citizens United regime: even before Citizens United,
money was not being kept out of the system very well. The same types of arguments about too much money in judicial politics are and were in play before and
after Citizens United. It is unknown whether interest groups (however defined)
are ready to spend more now than they did before. (If they did, would it really
matter, given all that is being spent already?) But the fact that they may if they
wish is a matter of concern.234
Finally, as noted above, some "non-monetary" problems with judicial
elections are the same both before and after Citizens United. The problem with
judicial elections is not just money and the incentive of judicial candidates to
235
pander both to campaign contributors and local voters.
The danger of judges
pandering in certain criminal cases has been particularly acknowledged by Jus23623
tice John Paul Stevens
and others. 237 As for some of the other problems un-

233

See Perspectives From the Rule of Law,supra note 18, at 94 (citing Adam Liptak & Janet

Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court'sRulings. N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1. 2006, at Al).

234

It is, of course, impossible to tell how many judicial races corporations or unions failed to

contribute to just because they did not have enough money available from funds that they could
have used before Citizens United.
235 See Karlan, supra note 14. at 90: Perspectives on JudicialSelection, supra note 14, at 957

("Some claim judges are, or appear to be, pressured to decide cases in popular ways or in ways
favorable to their campaign contributors - as opposed to on the basis of the law - to avoid
retribution on election day by the voters.").
The concept that judges may be tempted to shade their decisions to attract financial support should
not pass unnoticed. Although judges who are tempted in authoritarian regimes to cooperate with
the authorities in decision-making are regarded as object lessons on why the American system of

justice is preferable, the prior statement by Professor Karlan should give a neutral observer pause
when assessing American superiority. See also Perspectives From the Rule of Law, supra note

18. at 95 (describing telephone justice).
236 In Harrisv.Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995), Justice Stevens expressed concern over the impact ofjudicial elections on capital sentencing by judges, noting in dissent as follows:
The "higher authority" to whom present day capital judges may be "too responsive" is a political climate in which judges who covet higher office - or
who merely wish to remain judges - must constantly profess their fealty to
the death penalty. Alabama trial judges face partisan election every six years.
Ala. Code §17-2-7 (1987). The danger that they will bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the
same danger confronted by judges beholden to King George i1.
Id. at 519-20 (footnote omitted).
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related to money, the public elects judges, for the most part, without knowing
who the candidates are, how they have performed, and how they are likely to
perform. In addition, the information received through campaign advertising is
often misleading and unreliable and generally does not answer the question of
who is likely to be a good a judge. Voters typically receive no information
about which judicial candidates rate highly in temperament, scholarship, integrity, and efficiency; and sometimes voters know nothing more about a judge than
his or her name.
Neither is anything typically known of the judge's commitment to impartiality.
Many references throughout this Article consider international concepts
of the rule of law and international efforts at achieving rule of law reform.
There is nothing wrong with holding ourselves to our own best standards and
principles, a phrase made famous by Professor Abram Chayes; taking the lessons learned from the rule of law and international development sphere home;
and examining judicial bias in the United States through the lens of the rule of
law.239 It is interesting to imagine what we might say about the existence of
judicial bias - such as we see in the United States - were it prevalent in a
developing nation. Americans should "act in accordance with the noble principles 'that
this country espouses and that set it apart from the rest of the
24 °
world. ,

237

According to recent submissions by the National Association of Criminal Defense Attor-

neys, this pandering may affect criminal as well as civil cases, such as when a judicial candidates
runs on the slogan of being tough on crime. See supra note 17.
238

See generally Perspectives From the Rule of Law. supra note 18, at 99 et seq. (detailing

problems with judicial elections, including voter ignorance of the candidates). States with adequate judicial performance review systems are an exception, but judicial performance review is
most often used in appointment systems where a judge runs in a retention election following the
expiration of her term.
239

See Rosenbaum. supra note 18 (quoting Abram Chayes): Perspectives From the Rule of

Law, supra note 18, at 112. See also, Paul S. Reichler, Holding America to Its Own Best Standards: Abe Chayes and Nicaraguain the World Court, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 15, 15 (2001):

To the innumerable inquiries about why he was representing the Sandinistaled
government of Nicaragua in its World Court lawsuit against the Reaganistaled government of the United States, Professor Abram Chayes--Abe--always
gave the same answer:
To hold America to its own best standards.
To Abe, America's best standards included: respect for the rule of law; commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes; tolerance of a broad range of
political and philosophical opinion; sympathy for the victims of oppression
and injustice and vocation for truth in public discourse.
240

See Reichler, supra note 239, at 15:

To Abe Chayes. the lawsuit was much more than a defense of Nicaragua's universally recognized rights as a sovereign state: political independence; terri-

torial sovereignty; and freedom from foreign intervention in its internal affairs. It was, above all, a challenge to the powerful in Washington to act in ac-
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An observer has noted that democracy is an "institutionalized wager...
everyone who supports it and wishes to belong to a democratic political community assumes the risk" that the "'wrong' people and policies are chosen as the
result of fair elections. 2 41
It is unclear whether this is a reasonable wager to
ask Americans to make with regard to their elected judiciaries under present
conditions. Where too often neither they nor their neighbors know enough to
have any substantial basis for voting for one candidate or another, let alone
whether any candidate has any conception of, or commitment to, impartiality, it
seems unfair to ask Americans to be taking a risk of that sort.
Recognizing all this is the first step to doing something about it if we
choose to move forward as a rule of law society.

cordance with the noble principles that this country espouses and that set it
apart from the rest of the world.
See also id. at 46 ("Let us all honor Abe's memory, and the country he loved, by assuring that
America is always held to its own best standards.") For Professor Chayes' earlier career background, including his clerkship for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and his role in
the U.S. State Department as Legal Adviser under President John F. Kennedy, see Nuclear Weapons, The World Court, and Global Security: Living History Interview [With Abram Chayes], 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 459, 459-460 (1997) ("The President appoints the Legal Ad-

viser with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Legal Adviser has the rank of Assistant Secretary of State and has duties similar to those of the General Counsel of other cabinet departments.
He or she is the principal adviser to the Secretary in all matters of international law arising in the
conduct of U.S. foreign relations. The Secretary of State, in turn, acts as the principal foreign
policy adviser to the President and supervises the foreign relations of the United States. The Legal
Adviser also provides general legal advice and services to the Secretary and other officials of the
Department on legal matters concerning the Department and overseas posts.") Professor Chayes
was recently recalled in speeches by current Legal Adviser Harold Koh before the American
Society of International Law in Washington, D.C. on March 25, 2010 and again before the American Bar Association's Section of International Law's Meeting on April 14, 2010. The March 25,
2010 speech appears at http://faisalkutty.com/editors-picks/full-text-of-harold-koh / E2 / 80 / 99saddress-to-asil-mar-25-2010/
241 Ganev, supra note 12, at 267 (citing Guillermo O'Donnell, Democracy, Law and Comparative Politics, in 36 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2001)). O'Donnell

wrote:
What is the wager, then? It is that, in a democracy, every ego must accept that
practically every other adult participates - by voting and eventually by being
elected
in the act, fair elections, that determines who will govern them for
some time. It is an institutionalized wager because it is imposed on every ego
independently of his will: ego must accept it even if he believes that allowing
certain individuals to vote or be elected is very wrong. Ego has no option but
to take the chance that the "wrong" people and policies are chosen as the result of competitive elections.
Id. at 18.
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